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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study explores the relationship between two legislative elections that took 
place in Saint-Domingue, the first in 1793, before the enslaved were granted the rights of 
French citizens, and the second in 1796, after emancipation. Taken together, these 
elections provide a way of more fully examining what it looked like for the enslaved in 
Saint-Domingue to become enfranchised in a political community from which they had 
previously been excluded. The 1793 election sent deputies to Paris who entered into the 
debates that gave way to emancipation throughout the French Republic in 1794. Because 
emancipation took place under the Constitution of 1793, which extended voting rights to 
all male citizens, those who had once been enslaved were fully enfranchised in 1794. In 
light of this, I argue that the election of 1793 constituted a moment during which the 
colonized took up and expanded the ideals of the French Revolution beyond what had 
been imagined by those in the metropole. By 1795, however, a new constitution had 
been enacted that greatly restricted the franchise and re-imposed a system of 
representation. Hence, when elections were announced in 1796 in Saint-Domingue, 
nearly all those had been enfranchised in 1794 were barred from activating their newly 
acquired political status through the vote. This election thus illustrated that for those who 
were once enslaved, the threat of betrayal remained pervasive even after citizenship was 
granted. 
The primary aim of this project is to examine the shift that occurred between the 
elections of 1793 and 1796 in Saint-Domingue. I argue that this shift is integral for 
iii 
understanding the political and ideological changes that took place during the same 
period in metropolitan France, as well as the broader impact of the colonies on the 
continent during the Age of Revolution. In light of this, I maintain that the Haitian 
Revolution, and in particular the period during which the formerly enslaved were 
granted the rights of French citizenship, provides a decisive historical example for 
opening up new questions in political theory regarding the meaning of citizenship and 
universal emancipation in an increasingly globalized world.  
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
THE MEANING OF EMANCIPATION IN SAINT-DOMINGUE 
On the eve of the French Revolution, France possessed the most profitable 
colony in the world. By 1789, Saint-Domingue was exporting half of the world’s coffee 
and as much sugar as Jamaica, Cuba, and Brazil combined.1 Occupying the western half 
of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, the colony was no larger than the state of 
Massachusetts. Yet, Laurent Dubois says, “The livelihood of as many as a million of the 
twenty-five million inhabitants of France depended directly on the colonial trade. The 
slave colonies of the Caribbean were an engine for economic and social change in 
metropolitan France.”2  
It was in virtue of the African slave trade that this colony had such enormous 
profitability. In 1789, there were roughly eight thousand plantations in Saint-Domingue. 
Nearly half a million enslaved Africans inhabited the colony, comprising ninety percent 
of the overall population.3 As stipulated by the 1685 Code Noir, the enslaved lacked 
most forms of legal protection and had no right to political membership.4 Moreover, 
                                                
1 See Nancy Josephson, Spirits in Sequins: Voodu Flags of Haiti (Lancaster: Schiffer 
Publishing, 2007), 11. See also Madison Smartt Bell, Toussaint L’Ourverture (New 
York: Random House Inc., 2009), 13. 
2 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 21.  
3 See Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 21 and 30.  
4 The limited legal protection guaranteed by the Code Noir consisted in giving slaves the 
right to sue their masters if they used prohibited forms of brutality stipulated or violated 
rules concerning a slave’s claim to freedom as stipulated by the Code Noir. See Malick 
2 
because this system of slavery found its justification in racial casting, no person of color 
in Saint-Domingue, whether enslaved or not, had any political status in 1789. Thus, as 
word of the French Revolution spread throughout the French Antilles, a concern for 
attaining citizenship and the political status it afforded emerged on the grounds that the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen deemed all those within the domain of 
France free and equal.5  
In 1790, Vincent Ogé, a gens de couleur libre from Saint-Domingue, demanded 
the right to vote. After being refused, he initiated a rebellion in Cap Français, the capital 
city of Saint-Domingue. In the end, Ogé was arrested and subjected to a brutal, public 
execution by the French colonial authorities in Le Cap. Yet, while this initial uprising 
failed, those who had been oppressed by the French colonial regime for nearly a century 
and a half began to stir. On August 22, 1791, one hundred thousand enslaved Africans in 
the northern province of the colony took up arms against their masters. In so doing, they 
brought about an unprecedented revolution that would give way to the first formal 
emancipation decree in the Western Hemisphere in 1794 and culminate in the formation 
of Haiti in 1804, the only independent nation to arise from slave revolution.6 The Haitian 
                                                                                                                                           
Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) for an account of the ways in which the enslaved in Saint-
Domingue utilized the Code Noir to protect against the abuses of their masters during 
the revolutionary period.  
5 For a discussion of how the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen impacted the 
French Antilles, and particularly Martinique and Guadalupe, see Laurent Dubois, A 
Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave emancipation in the French Caribbean 
(Raleigh: UNC Press, 2004).  
6 See CLR James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution (New York: Random House, 1963), 63-74. See also chapter IV of this text 
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Revolution can therefore be seen as intervening in the broader Age of Revolution by 
taking to task the banner of universal emancipation that was being touted throughout 
metropolitan France. Though it has been widely overlooked in the historiography of this 
period,  the significance of the Haitian Revolution is unparalleled insofar as it gave new 
meaning to the Rights of Man and, in so doing, reshaped the Atlantic world. 
The purpose of this project is to examine more fully what it looked like for the 
enslaved in Saint-Domingue to become enfranchised in a political community from 
which they had previously been excluded. To do this, I will focus on two elections that 
took place in Saint-Domingue, the first in 1793, before the enslaved were granted the 
rights of French citizens, and the second in 1796 in the wake of emancipation. During 
the election of 1793, several deputies, including the former slave Jean-Baptiste Belley, 
were chosen to represent Saint-Domingue in the National Convention. Upon arriving in 
France, these deputies entered the debate regarding emancipation, which ultimately led 
to the National Convention’s decision to fully enfranchise the enslaved throughout the 
Republic of France in February of 1794 under the auspices of the radically democratic 
Constitution of Year I (1793). Hence, in the wake of the 1793 election in Saint-
Domingue, the revolutionary ideal of universal emancipation became embodied by the 
enslaved who, after freeing themselves, were extended the rights of French citizenship 
and granted access to the political community from which they had previously been 
excluded.  
                                                                                                                                           
for an especially rich description of the beginning of the slave insurgence in Saint-
Domingue.  
4 
Yet, as I will suggest, this ideal was thrown back on itself during the election of 
1796. By 1795 a new constitution had been enacted that greatly restricted the franchise 
and re-imposed a system of representation. As result, when elections were announced in 
1796 in Saint-Domingue nearly all those had been enfranchised in 1794 were barred 
from activating their newly acquired political status through the vote. As I will argue, the 
shift from the election of 1793 to the election of 1796 in Saint-Domingue is emblematic 
of a tragic turn bound up with what it means to become enfranchised in the modern era. 
Specifically, it exposes a tension between political inclusion and the violence of 
assimilation that is necessitated by the universal aims of modern politics. The election of 
1793 represented an initial step in a process by which the colonized took up and 
expanded the ideals of the French Revolution beyond what had been imagined by those 
in the metropole. In so doing, this election was emblematic of the promise of inclusion 
that is bound up with the ideals of modern politics. The election of 1796, by contrast, 
illustrated that for those who were once enslaved, the threat of betrayal remained 
pervasive even after citizenship was granted. As such, the Haitian Revolution, and 
specifically the attempt on the part of the formerly enslaved to enter into French political 
life, reveals a specter of exclusion that persists for those who become enfranchised after 
having been cast out.  
In light of this, I maintain that the elections in Saint-Domingue are integral for 
raising questions regarding the price of inclusion in the modern political sphere. In 
drawing attention to this specter of exclusion, I argue too that the elections give rise to 
an impossible choice between assimilation and revolution. As I will suggest, the 
5 
impossibility of this choice is epitomized in the relationship between Toussaint 
L’Ouverture, who, upon endorsing the ideals of the French Revolution, was ultimately 
betrayed by them, and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, whose call for independence never fully 
superseded the values of France’s colonial enterprise.  
In developing the significance of the elections in Saint-Domingue, the broader 
aim of this project is three-fold. First, I want to draw attention to the significance of 
voting rights in Saint-Domingue, which have been widely overlooked by historians of 
the revolutionary period. Insofar as it was through the vote that citizens activated their 
political membership, voting rights provide a fruitful site for investigating what it might 
have meant to go from slave to citizen during the revolutionary period. The debates 
regarding suffrage in revolutionary France were enormously complex and gave way to 
extensive discussion regarding what it meant to bring the ideals of the Enlightenment to 
bear on the public sphere. In a similar fashion, taking up the question of what it meant to 
go from slave to citizen by way of voting rights in Saint-Domingue provides a method 
for exploring the scope and limits of the ideal of universal emancipation in the context of 
colonization. Moreover, towering illiteracy rates and general neglect of the voice of the 
masses in the historical record make it nearly impossible to discern the meaning of 
emancipation for the formerly enslaved through first hand accounts. As Carolyn Fick 
remarks, “For the vast majority [of the enslaved], the ability to read and write was an 
unknown luxury. So they left no memoirs, pamphlets, tracts, nor accounts of events.”7 
Hence, while it is exceptionally difficult to re-inscribe the voices that have been silenced 
                                                
7 Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint-Domingue Revolution From Below 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 9.  
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in the historical record, I want to suggest that a thorough examination of voting rights in 
Saint-Domingue can help to provide a more robust narrative of what it might have meant 
to go from slave to citizen that extends beyond the accounts offered by revolutionary 
leaders.  
Second, I want to suggest that a study of voting rights in Saint-Domingue is not 
only helpful for understanding what it meant to go from slave to citizen in the colonial 
context, but also integral for rethinking the impact of the colonies on the metrople during 
the revolutionary period. There is no doubt that the threat from below made manifest 
through the enactment of universal male suffrage in continental France had an influence 
in curbing the liberal ideals of the French Revolution. Yet, little has been done to 
examine how the threat from below in the colonies, made manifest through the 
enfranchisement of the formerly enslaved in 1794, informed the movement away from 
the sentiment of “the people” expressed in 1793 and towards the far more conservative 
Constitution of 1795. Therefore, I want to suggest that by more carefully considering the 
nature of voting in the colonial context, it is possible to open up new questions regarding 
the ways in which Saint-Domingue and the broader colonial world shaped the trajectory 
of revolutionary France.  
Third, I aim to show that the Haitian Revolution, and in particular, the period 
during which the formerly enslaved were granted the rights of French citizenship, is 
theoretically significant for understanding political life in the modern era. While its 
theoretical significance has largely been overlooked in the western tradition, the Haitian 
Revolution and, in particular, the elections in Saint-Domingue, expose a tension between 
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political inclusion and the violence of assimilation that I want to suggest is endemic to 
what it means to become enfranchised in the modern era. In turning to the period 
between 1793 and 1796 in Saint-Domingue, I therefore want to draw attention to a 
lacuna in modern political  philosophy and suggest that while it has largely been omitted 
from our historical memory, the Haitian Revolution and the tension it reveals should be 
understood as part and parcel to the birth of modern politics. Moreover, I want to suggest 
that upon being brought within the fold of this theoretical discourse, the Haitian 
Revolution can open up new questions in contemporary political philosophy regarding 
the politics of exclusion and the meaning of citizenship in an increasingly globalized 
world.    
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF REVOLUTION IN SAINT-DOMINGUE 
Given that history seems to favor the European voice, the revolution in Saint-
Domingue is often depicted in the historical record as a barbaric deviation in the history 
of mankind’s progression towards enlightenment. Haitian historian Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot has written extensively on the way in which the history of colonization and, in 
particular, the Haitian Revolution, became lost in the colonizer’s mythical rhetoric 
regarding the discovery of “the new world.”8 For this reason, the work of figures like 
Jean Price-Mars, CLR James, and Aimé Cesairé, all of whom sought to reinvent this 
history in the early and mid-twentieth century, is of utmost importance. Jean Price-Mars 
can be credited with introducing the notion of a black consciousness through his history 
of the Haitian Revolution in works like So Spoke the Uncle. In The Black Jacobins, CLR 
                                                
8 See Michel-Rolph Touillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).  
8 
James drew heavily on Price-Mars’s narrative to provide an account of the Haitian 
Revolution oriented by both Marxist and anti-colonial themes. Likewise, Aimé Césaire 
relied on Price-Mars’s conception of black consciousness to draw the figure of Toussaint 
L’Ouverture into the negritude and anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s.9 
Thus, in re-appropriating the Haitian Revolution, their efforts paved the way for 
contemporary historians like Trouillot to draw attention to the one-sided story that has 
been told in the historiography of revolutionary period. This, in turn, has given rise to a 
new historiography that takes seriously the seismic impact that the Haitian Revolution 
had on the broader Atlantic world. 
For the purposes of my project, this scholarship is helpful for shedding light on 
debates concerning the gap between the ideals that guided the French Revolution and 
their application in the political sphere. It has also opened up new questions concerning  
the relation between metropole and colony and the ways in which notions of citizenship 
and national identity had to be rethought during this period. Furthermore, it draws 
attention to the fact that the revolution ended with a declaration of independence from 
France and the creation of what was supposed to be a homeland for all those who had 
suffered at the hand of colonial oppression. In so doing, recent scholarship on the 
revolutionary period in Saint-Domingue has generated important insights into the 
politics of race, the ethics of violence, and the role colonization played in giving birth to 
the modern world. Therefore, while the Haitian Revolution has been taken for granted in 
                                                
9 See Amié Césaire, Toussaint-Louverture, la Revolution Française et le Probleme 
Colonial (Paris: Présence Africaine, 2000). 
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the mainstream historiography of the French Revolution, the burgeoning body of 
literature concerning Saint-Domingue and the broader Atlantic world is helping to 
uncover the vast implications that events like the Haitian Revolution have for 
understanding modern politics today. 
Yet, voting rights have not yet been seriously considered in this new 
historiography. This is especially true in the case of the 1796 election. While several 
scholars, including Laurent Dubois, Jeremy Popkin, and John Patrick Walsh mention 
this election in passing, none account for it in any kind of detail.10 Robert Stein, in 
Léger-Félicité Sonthonax: The Lost Sentinel of the Republic offers the most thorough 
discussion of this election, but he leaves unanswered a number of questions regarding its 
significance for the broader population of Saint-Domingue, focusing instead on the 
military and political strife that he argues gave rise to this election.  
Additionally, the period between 1794 and 1797 in Saint-Domingue has 
remained largely unexamined, particularly with respect to the kind of political status that 
slaves acquired upon receiving the rights of French citizenship. Much has been done to 
evaluate the trajectory of the Haitian Revolution leading up to emancipation. For 
instance, in The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution, Malick Ghachem provides an 
integral account of the impact that the Code Noir had on the way the enslaved in Saint-
Domingue conceptualized freedom on the basis of the laws of the ancien régime. In so 
doing, he seeks to illustrate that the legal legacy of emancipation in Saint-Domingue had 
                                                
10 See Dubois, Avengers of the New World, Jeremy Popkin A Concise History of the 
Haitian Revolution (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), and John Patrick Walsh Free 
and French: Toussaint Louverture, Aime Cesaire and Narratives of Loyal Oppression 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
10 
its roots in slave law predating the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Yet, 
Ghachem’s narrative only considers how this played out in the years between 1789 and 
1794. Similarly, Jeremy Popkin’s discussion of the destruction of Cap Français in You 
are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery offers an important 
narrative of the underlying political struggle that gave rise to the decrees of 1793 and 
1794. Like Ghachem, however, Popkin does not go beyond 1794 to consider what it 
looked like to become a citizen after emancipation. A great deal of scholarship also 
exists on the period from 1801 to the end of the revolution and beyond, tracing the 
development of Haiti’s independence. For instance, both Laurent Dubois’s discussion of 
the trajectory Haiti took in the wake of the revolution in Haiti: The Aftershocks of 
History and Sibylle Fischer’s discussion in Modernity Disavowed offer especially 
intriguing analyses of what Haitian independence meant in the nineteenth century. Yet, 
neither consider the brief period during which those who had been slaves became French 
citizens. I take this period during the Age of Revolution to be particularly important, as it 
pushed the revolutionary proclamation that all men are born free and equal to its furthest 
limit. Therefore, this project contributes to the historiography of the Atlantic world  by 
providing a more complete account of what it looked like on the other side of 
emancipation, after the enslaved had become free but before an independent Haitian 
state began taking shape.  
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ELECTIONS IN FRANCE AND SAINT-DOMINGUE DURING THE 
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
This project will unfold in three parts, the first dealing with the social and 
political sentiments underlying the legal framework for voting during the French 
Revolution, the second with the 1796 election in Saint-Domingue, and the third with the 
ramifications of this history for contemporary political theory. I will begin in Chapter II, 
“The Promise of Political Inclusion: Voting in France and Saint-Domingue,” with a 
general discussion of suffrage during the French Revolution. In this chapter, I will sketch 
the development of the right to vote in relation to the ideal of universal emancipation 
during the French Revolution by considering the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen in 1789 through the Constitution of 1791, the Constitution of 1793, and the 
Constitution of 1795. Using the work of François Furet, Keith Baker, Malcolm Crook, 
and Lynn Hunt, I will focus on how the franchise and the definition of citizenship shifted 
toward and away from direct democracy over the course of the first five years of the 
French Revolution. This, in turn, will set the stage for analyzing the legal framework of 
the elections in Saint-Domingue.  
Though I will rely on the work of these thinkers to sketch the social and political 
climate that under-girded the legal framework for voting in revolutionary France, I will 
also draw attention to a gap in Crook’s analysis of elections during the French 
Revolution. In particular, I will consider his discussion of the period between June 1793, 
when the Constitution of Year I was adopted and universal male suffrage was ratified by 
popular referendum, and 1795 when a new, less democratic constitution was adopted. 
12 
Crook maintains that while the Constitution of 1793 did indeed stipulate a radically 
broad franchise, no elections took place until after 1795. He thus argues that despite the 
common assumption that French election procedures gave way to a democratic 
consciousness based on the idea of universal male suffrage, in fact, no election took 
place under these auspices.  
Yet, Crook’s analysis overlooks one particularly important election that was held 
in Saint-Domingue in September of 1793 in accordance with the Constitution of Year I. I 
will thus develop a narrative of this election in relation to the 1793 Decree of General 
Liberty and the National Convention’s 1794 emancipation decree, as well as the debates 
over the franchise that took place in the metropole during the same period. Insofar as the 
deputies who were elected to represent Saint-Domingue contributed to the National 
Convention’s decision to ratify Sonthonax’s Decree of General Liberty throughout the 
Republic of France, I argue in this chapter that it was emblematic of the way the events 
in Saint-Domingue pushed the ideals of the French Revolution to their furthest limits.  
As such, this election gave way to the promise of inclusion for the formerly enslaved.  
In Chapter III, “The Specter of Exclusion: Accounting for the Election of 1796 in 
Cap Français,” I will provide a narrative of what happened in Saint-Domingue in the 
wake of the promissory note of 1793 and 1794, by turning to the legislative election that 
took place in Cap Français in 1796. My aim in this chapter will be two-fold. First, I want 
to provide a more nuanced account of the 1796 election in Saint-Domingue. Second, I 
want to consider in broader terms what it would have meant for those who had recently 
been enfranchised to be barred from participating in the 1796 election. In so doing, I 
13 
maintain that this election had enormous symbolic significance to the extent that it was 
the first time that those who had once been enslaved had an opportunity to enter into 
French political life as fully enfranchised citizens. Thus, in addition to telling a more 
complete story of the 1796 election than has been told before, I also want to consider 
why this election ultimately stopped short of providing this opportunity. 
The 1796 elections occurred at a particularly tumultuous moment during the 
Haitian Revolution. In addition to trying to ward off the British and Spanish, Toussaint 
L’Ouverture’s troops were also faced with increasingly hostile race relations between 
free men of color and newly freed slaves, which ultimately came to a head during the 
Villatte Affair in the Spring of 1796. Beyond this, Saint-Domingue’s revolutionary 
leaders were suspicious allies of the French during this period, and thus the call for these 
elections had as much to do with the struggle for power between Sonthonax, 
L’Ouverture, and the gens de couleur libre in the southern province  as it did with any 
kind of democratic impulse.11 I will therefore begin this chapter by drawing on Stein, 
Laurent Dubois, CLR James, Thomas Madiou, and Bernard Gainot to give contour to the 
political and military dynamics that provided the backdrop for electoral assembly that 
convened in Le Cap in September of 1796.  
Relying primarily on the transcript from the electoral assembly that convened in 
Le Cap between September 7 and September 13, 1796, I will then provide a narrative of 
how this election unfolded. By using the procès-verbaux or official reports of the 
primary elections that took place in the cantons throughout Saint-Domingue along with 
                                                
11 See especially Chapter 10 in Robert Louis Stein, Léger Félicité Sonthonax: The Lost 
Sentinel of the Republic (Toronto: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985).  
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the financial requirements that were stipulated by the Constitution of Year III regarding 
the right to vote, I will offer an account of who would have been able to vote, as well as 
the process by which voting took place at both the primary and electoral levels. I will 
then consider the accounts provided by scholars like Madiou, who suggest that the 
election was heavily manipulated by Sonthonax, alongside the debates that took place in 
regard to the legitimacy of this election in the 1797 Legislative Corps in Paris.  
In light of this, I want to suggest that even the most generous interpretation of the 
1796 election reveals that while the formerly enslaved had been granted the rights of 
French citizens in 1794, the inclusion that this promised was never fully realized.  
Beyond this, I will gesture towards the idea that the restrictive voting regulations 
imposed in 1795 helped to ensure the French colonies remained united under the law of 
the French Republic. In other words, given that limiting the franchise made it possible to 
avoid the threat that was posed by granting political rights to hundreds of thousands of 
former slaves, it seems likely that this conservative turn was not just a consequence of 
unrest in the metropole, but also of France’s desire to retain its colonial enterprise. 
Therefore, when considered in relation to the events that came before it, the 1796 
election raises the question of the extent to which it is possible to carry out the task of 
politics in a world where both the threat of betrayal and the memory of exclusion 
remains present. Turning to the work of Mimi Sheller, I will conclude this chapter by 
suggesting that the implications of this election get cashed out in the unresolved conflict 
between L’Ouverture and Dessalines regarding the limits of assimilation and revolution 
for the formerly enslaved.  
15 
Chapter IV, “Conclusion: Arendt, Price-Mars, and Glissant on Enfranchisement 
and Exclusion,” will address the broader implications of the Haitian Revolution, and 
especially the period between 1793 and 1797, for contemporary concerns in social and 
political philosophy. Specifically, I will argue that the Haitian Revolution ought to be 
brought within the fold of this discourse, so as to open up new questions concerning the 
politics of exclusion in relation to the meaning of citizenship and universal rights.  
I will begin in this chapter by tracing the impact of the French Revolution on political 
philosophy through the work of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and Karl Marx. In 
failing to fulfill the rational principles set forth by the Enlightenment,  the French 
Revolution opened up a set of new problems for these thinkers that came to be 
understood as distinctive of political life in the modern era. Their reflections on the 
French Revolution thus resituated the lines of the debate regarding the political sphere. 
Moreover, they came to shape the critiques of modernity that emerged in the twentieth 
century in response to the unprecedented destruction of the first and second world wars, 
the rapid ascendance of totalitarianism, and the horrors of the concentration camps. 
Consequently, those in the twentieth century attempting to come to terms with these 
events took their point of departure for diagnosing the problems of modern political life 
almost exclusively from the French Revolution.   
As I will argue, however, the birth of modern politics and the problems contained 
therein cannot be understood solely in terms of the French Revolution. In this chapter, I 
will attempt to show that insofar as the Haitian Revolution and the colonial context more 
generally reveals the specter of exclusion that persists for those who become 
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enfranchised, it can and should be used to deepen European social and political thought, 
particularly with regard to questions of citizenship. To illustrate this, I will focus on the 
German Jewish scholar, Hannah Arendt, whose work in the field of social and political 
philosophy concerns the problem of political exclusion and the importance of citizenship 
after the Holocaust. Through her analysis of statelessness, Arendt offers a rich and 
prescient critique of modern politics that demands we rethink the meaning of political 
life in an age scarred by totalitarianism. In particular, she suggests it is necessary to twist 
free from the Enlightenment ideal of liberty and turn instead to a notion freedom that is 
rooted in political community. A lived and embodied conception of citizenship thus 
comes to occupy a central position in Arendt’s overall political theory.  
Yet, her suggestion that citizenship alone can remedy the effects of political 
exclusion does not go far enough. In diagnosing the problem of statelessness, Arendt 
rightly attaches great value to citizenship and political community, which she believes 
has gotten lost in the abstract idea of inalienable rights that were brought to bear on the 
political sphere during the Age of Revolution. However, she does not consider what it 
means to become enfranchised in a community from which one had previously been 
excluded. Insofar as Arendt’s notion of political action consists in preserving a space in 
which freedom can appear, freedom for her requires that individuals act for the sake of 
carrying the community to which they belong from the past into the future. This, it 
seems, complicates political life for those who acquire citizenship after having been 
excluded, as it renders their legitimacy within the political sphere contingent upon 
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recognizing and being recognized within a set of institutions, traditions, and values that 
were never meant for them.12 
It is possible to bring this problem into focus by considering Arendt’s conception 
of citizenship in light of the elections that took place during the Haitian Revolution. The 
election of 1793 and the subsequent enfranchisement of the formerly enslaved in 1794 
seems to be emblematic of what Arendt believes politics in the modern era should do; 
namely, reach out to those who have been excluded. Yet, as the election of 1796 
demonstrated, becoming enfranchised was not enough to guarantee the rights that Arendt 
takes to be constitutive of political freedom. This historical moment illustrates that for 
those who become enfranchised, the specter of exclusion remains present. 
In light of this, I will consider how the Haitian Revolution has been taken up 
within the African Diaspora for the sake of generating a political tradition that engages 
directly with this specter of exclusion. In particular, I will focus on the work of Jean 
Price-Mars who reinterprets Haitian Voodoo and Creole through Haiti’s revolutionary 
past. In so doing, he suggests that Haitian culture is neither European nor African, but 
rather a creative appropriation that expresses an inability to be fully assimilated either 
way.  I will then consider the work of Edouard Glissant, whose poetics of relation and 
conception of “creolization” suggest a way of affirming this tension by living within it, 
                                                
12 See Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1993). Here she clarifies the terms “political action,” 
“freedom,” and “tradition.” Thus, I will be relying heavily on this text, as well as The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1951) to clarify her 
analysis of political life in Chapter IV.  
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rather than trying to overcome it by turning to another community for the sake of 
adopting a less dislocated sense of self.  
Taken together with Price-Mars and Glissant, I will argue that Arendt’s 
conception of citizenship is too narrow to distinguish sufficiently between political 
inclusion and the violence of assimilation. Moreover, in taking her point of departure 
from the French Revolution alone, she is unable to see that it is constitutive of modern 
political life that becoming enfranchised is accompanied by this violence. By contrast, 
Price-Mars and Glissant, in turning to the Haitian Revolution, are able to not only 
illustrate the significance of the event itself, but also the way in which the problems it 
poses remain present for those who were once cast out. By rethinking Arendt and figures 
like her from out of the Haitian Revolution, it is possible to expand their analyses so that 
they can more adequately address what it means for those who were once excluded to 
become enfranchised. Moreover, I will argue that insofar as the Haitian Revolution 
cannot be understood apart from the birth of modern politics, it ought to be brought 
within the fold of the west’s historical memory for the sake of complicating and 
advancing the question of political exclusion that has occupied European political 
theorists for the last century. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE PROMISE OF POLITICAL INCLUSION: VOTING IN FRANCE AND SAINT- 
 
DOMINGUE 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the legal and political discourse that 
framed the debate concerning suffrage during the French Revolution and how this was 
then taken up in the context of emancipation in Saint-Domingue. In what follows, I will 
take the work of François Furet, Lynn Hunt, and Keith Baker together to develop an 
account of how the language contained in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen both oriented the revolution towards the ideal of universal rights while also 
preventing it from fully coming to terms with this ideal. The debates that arose regarding 
suffrage during the revolutionary decade provide a decisive illustration of this. 
Therefore, I will also consider how the language of citizenship shifted in relation to the 
franchise in the constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795. Relying heavily on the work of 
Malcolm Crook, this chapter will provide a broad sketch of the political ideologies that 
influenced the legal parameters for elections and voting rights in revolutionary France. 
In so doing, I argue, like Crook, that these elections establish a link for the historian 
between the notion of “the people” that formed the backbone of the political rhetoric in 
revolutionary France and its practical application.  
Yet, I also want to draw attention to a gap in Crook’s analysis. Specifically, I will 
turn to his discussion of the period between June 1793, when the Constitution of Year I 
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was accepted and universal male suffrage was ratified by popular referendum, and 1795 
when a new, less democratic constitution was adopted. Crook suggests that while the 
Constitution of 1793 did indeed stipulate a radically broad franchise, no elections took 
place until after 1795. Consequently, he contends that despite the common assumption 
that French election procedures gave way to a democratic consciousness based on the 
idea of universal male suffrage, in fact, no election took place under these auspices.  
In Saint-Domingue, however, one election was held in September of 1793. 
During this election, which came on the heels of Léger Félicité Sonthonax’s “Decree of 
General Liberty” in August 1793, several deputies, including the former slave Jean-
Baptiste Belley, were chosen to represent Saint-Domingue in the National Convention. 
Upon arriving in France, these deputies entered the debate regarding emancipation, 
which ultimately gave way in February of 1794 to the National Convention’s ratification 
of Sonthonax’s decree and the abolition of slavery throughout the Republic of France. I 
will thus provide a discussion in this chapter of the process by which the abolition of 
slavery became codified in French law. In so doing, I argue that by neglecting the 1793 
election in Saint-Domingue, Crook and others overlook a particularly fruitful site for 
examining the radically democratic sentiment expressed in the election procedures and 
extended franchise that was stipulated by the Constitution of 1793. This election, in 
giving way to the abolition of slavery throughout the French Republic in 1794, took up 
and expanded the ideals of the French Revolution by pushing the notion of universal 
emancipation to its furthest limits. Therefore, as I will argue, it was an especially 
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significant moment in what Crook describes as France’s “apprenticeship in democracy,” 
insofar as it pointed to the promise of the inclusive aims of the revolutionary period.  
THE 1789 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN 
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, in espousing a universal 
conception of rights, ushered in a notion of “the people” that set revolutionary France on 
an irreversible course. As François Furet says:  
What the French brought into being at the end of the eighteenth century was not 
politics as a laicized and distinct area of critical reflection but democratic politics 
as a national ideology. The secret of the success of 1789, its message and its 
lasting influence lie in that invention, which was unprecedented and whose 
legacy was to be so widespread.13  
Yet, reconciling the democratic sentiment expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen with the space of politics created a dilemma for revolutionary leaders. 
                                                
13 François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 26. Furet’s claim here is imbedded within a broader rejection of the 
Marxist paradigm for interpreting the French Revolution. Drawing from the work of 
Alfred Cobban, Furet argues that social analyses of the revolutionary period not only 
depict the social character of revolutionary France in overly simplistic ways, but also 
cover over what made the French Revolution revolutionary. On Furet’s account, the 
events of 1789 were revolutionary because a new kind of political language was created 
to frame them as such. This language, he argues, provided a foundation for a new kind of 
society oriented by democratic ideals. In turning to political culture rather than class 
structure to interpret the French Revolution, Furet’s work thus marked a shift in the 
historiography of the French Revolution that called on historians to rethink 1789 as a 
pioneering moment rather than an inevitable consequence of class conflict. For more on 
this, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 27 and Lynn Avery Hunt, Politics 
Culture and Class in the French Revolution (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2004), 23. 
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As I will suggest in what follows, this dilemma was brought into relief during the 
constitutional debates of 1791, 1793, and 1795 regarding the right to vote.  
Lynn Hunt explains that the use of the term “declaration” in both the French and 
American context at the end of the eighteenth century unambiguously indicated an 
attempt to “seize sovereignty.”14 In so doing, it also signified a decisive break from the 
regime of the past. Unlike the Americans, the French had not committed to breaking 
from the monarch in 1789. Even so, rather than merely giving speeches or drafting laws, 
Hunt says that the French National Assembly felt compelled “to put in writing for 
posterity that rights flowed not from a compact between ruler and citizens, less still from 
a petition to him or a charter granted to him, but rather from the nature of human beings 
themselves.”15 Though at first there was widespread disagreement among the Assembly 
members about whether or not a “declaration” was necessary, since it implied an intent 
to rebuild the old government from scratch, a desire eventually emerged among the 
majority of the Assembly to do just this. Consequently, an official declaration of rights 
came to be understood as essential, and the Assembly voted on August 4, 1789 to draft 
the document.16  
While the idea of the rights of man had been accepted prior to the storming of the 
Bastille on July 14, Furet says that the debates leading up to the final formulation of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen were “long, complex, contradictory, and 
                                                
14 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2008), 115.  
15 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 115. 
16 Hunt explains that while there was a changing tide of opinion in favor of drafting a 
declaration of rights, no one has successfully been able to provide an account of how this 
shift happened. See Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 130. 
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passed through the filter of numerous preparatory drafts.”17 Amid growing anxiety about 
the future and widespread disagreement regarding the underlying aims of the revolution, 
the Assembly compromised on a temporary document drafted by a subcommittee 
composed of forty members. The subcommittee debated the proposed twenty-four 
articles of the declaration over the course of six days and ultimately agreed to adopt 
seventeen of them.18 Though the assembly had planned to revisit the document after 
drafting a new constitution, Hunt explains that the question was never reopened.19  
Consequently, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was adopted in its 
complete form on August 26, 1789.  
Furet explains that the document sought to enumerate a social contract according 
to natural law that would guarantee equal rights to those who entered into it. In declaring 
first and foremost that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights” it boldly 
asserted that rights were to be understood as universal.20 Drawing inspiration from the 
American Declaration of Independence, this appeal to universality in the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen first set forth the notion that all people, without appeal to 
external authority, are endowed with certain inalienable rights.21 These rights included 
life, liberty, property and freedom from oppression, which further implied the right to 
                                                
17 François Furet, The French Revolution 1770-1814 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers 
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18 See Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 131. 
19 Ibid, 131. 
20 See Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Article 1, August 26 1789. All 
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Jones, The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Longman Inc., 
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civil and fiscal equality, individual liberty, the admissibility of everyone for 
employment, habeas corpus, non-retroactive laws, and guarantee of property.22  
In maintaining that these rights were deducible through reason and required no 
appeal to an external authority, Hunt says, “The challenge to the old order of Europe 
could not have been more forthright.”23 Furthermore, the document implied that in being 
inalienable, these rights were constitutive of what it meant to be human. Nowhere in the 
1789 Declaration are these rights specified according to particular groups. There is no 
explicit reference to class, religion, or sex, and instead, terms like “all citizens,” “no 
citizens,” “all men,” “no man,” “all society,” and “any society” are used throughout.24 
As such, it proclaimed that all of humanity, regardless of religion, class, sex, or race had 
an indelible claim to the rights of man.25  
Hunt explains that the original intention of the Committee on the Constitution 
had been to prepare several documents that clarified the rights of man, the rights of the 
nation, the rights of the king and the rights of citizens. Yet, the document that was 
ultimately adopted only clarified the first two, and while the declaration mentions 
citizenship, the final version does not delineate the qualifications for it.26  
The declaration’s lack of specificity, while aimed at providing a ground for the 
legitimacy of all political association, subsequently gave rise to serious difficulty 
concerning those who had historically been denied such rights. That is, Hunt says, “If 
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rights serve as a foundation of legitimacy, what justified their limitation to people of 
certain ages, sexes, races, religions, or wealth?”27 As I will discuss, this difficulty 
becomes especially pronounced in the debates regarding suffrage, as it is here that the 
ideals of the 1789 Declaration are brought to bear on the political sphere through popular 
practice.    
Furthermore, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was drafted in response 
to what Furet describes as a violent break from a national past that was fundamentally 
antithetical to this kind of contract. The declaration itself did not specify the role of the 
king in relation to the sovereignty of the nation. Hence, Furet explains that its writers, 
unlike their American counterparts, were faced with the challenge of synchronizing a 
new idea of inalienable rights with a social order that was not amenable to the notion of 
natural equality.28 Furet says: 
The idea that the affirmation of subjective rights of individuals as a foundation of 
the contract carried the risk of social breakdown has haunted European political 
thought ever since Burke, from conservatives to socialists; it was already fully 
present in the July and August debates of 1789.29  
In contrast to the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen combined the notion of natural rights with positive law, thereby placing the 
responsibility to ensure the Rights of Man on society as a whole.30 In being predicated 
on the notion that the people are sovereign, the Declaration was therefore designed to be 
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an expression of the general will. Defining and organizing “the people” or nation as 
sovereign by means of a constitution, however, gave way to innumerable difficulties. In 
particular, this constitution would have to contend with the fact that the inhabitants of 
the French kingdom had only been subjects of a king and never citizens of a nation. 
Therefore, Furet says, “This could not be a shaky monument made up of ancient customs 
and haphazard revisions, like the ancien régime monarchy, but an ensemble of 
institutions based on new principles, which were those of reason.”31  
According to Keith Baker, three routes were proposed for formulating a new 
constitution. The first consisted in introducing a complex system of checks and balances 
that retained a monarchy but only insofar as this monarchy was linked to national 
representation whereby each branch of power was limited by the other. This option, 
proposed by Gérard de Lally-Tollendal and Jean Joseph Mounier, was modeled after the 
English constitutional monarchy and offered the most conservative path in giving the 
king the power of absolute veto.32 The second was based on the Rousseauian notion of 
the general will and consisted in taking up a radically new constitution that was oriented 
most fundamentally by popular sovereignty. On this model, sovereignty resided in the 
people and was inalienable and indivisible. Further, the people would hold legislative 
power so as to ensure positive law was an expression of the general will. These laws 
would then be enforced by means of a subordinate executive power.33 The third and final 
option, based on the proposal of Abbé Sieyès, involved implementing a constitution that 
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appealed to a unitary representative body, rather than the people in primary assemblies, 
for the expression of the general will.34 This model, like the Rousseauian one, consisted 
of a constitution brought about through an act of national sovereignty. Further, it 
abandoned the notion of a royal veto and thus offered a radical alterative to 
constitutional monarchy. Yet, the underlying sentiment of this proposal was that direct 
democracy was impossible in France. If constituted by “the people,” Sieyès argued, 
France could not be one and united. Therefore, this proposal also offered a critique of the 
Rousseauian notion of the general will in suggesting that the people can only speak and 
act effectively through representation.35   
Though the National Assembly pressed Louis XVI to endorse the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man, the king merely gave his ascendance rather than his acceptance on 
October 5, 1789.36 Baker explains that the ambiguous nature of this response prompted 
fear among the Assembly’s deputies because it indicated that the king might refuse the 
constitution and, in so doing, “Subvert liberty, restore despotism, and annihilate the very 
principle of national sovereignty.”37 As this was unsatisfactory, the Assembly voted to 
require the King’s pure acceptance, whereby the constitution would not be a pact 
between the King and the nation. Rather, while a constitutional monarchy would be 
retained, it would be “instituted and organized on the basis of the principle of national 
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sovereignty.”38 Yet, placing the right to change the constitution in the hands of the 
people, raised concerns regarding the fact that popular action could force the revision or 
repudiation of the founding principles of the constitution. The Constitution of 1791 thus 
placed limitations on national sovereignty by establishing an electoral process based on 
representation. Additionally, in an effort to protect national sovereignty from the dangers 
of representation, the Assembly also permitted the monarch to veto legislative decrees.39  
Baker explains, however, that rather than protecting the sovereignty of the general will, 
this ultimately frustrated it. Consequently, he says, “Popular demands for action against 
the king were followed by demands for immediate action to change the constitution, 
demands that also required repudiation of the restrictive provisions regarding 
constitutional revision established under the Constitution of 1791.”40 According to 
Baker, the chaos that followed can be blamed on the tension between the unrestricted 
power of national sovereignty and the constraints of the constitution. This can perhaps 
best be seen by examining the conflict between representation and direct democracy as it 
was made manifest in the electoral process that took shape in the first five years of the 
French Revolution.  
VOTING AND REPRESENTATION IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1791, 1793, 
AND 1795  
 In what follows, I will trace the concern in France regarding representation 
through the debates over the franchise and its relation to citizenship through the 
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Constitutions of 1791, 1793 (Year I), and 1795 (Year III). In so doing, I want to sketch 
the transition towards and away from direct democracy and universal male suffrage 
during this period. This will help set the stage for evaluating voting rights in Saint-
Domingue and give contour to both the promise of inclusion that was made during the 
1793 election in Saint-Domingue and the subsequent failure of the French to make good 
on this promise in 1796.  
 Crook explains that while it is often overlooked, a long tradition of voting existed 
in France prior to the revolution. Further, though many focus only on the 
cahiers de doléances or lists of grievances that were drawn up throughout France in 
1789, few have considered the significance of the elections to the Estates General that 
took place at the same time.41 Given the tumultuous conditions under which the 1789 
Estates General was called and the fact that the Estates General had not convened since 
1614, Crook says that measures had to be taken both to preserve custom and tradition 
while also accommodating unprecedented circumstance. Though these measures did 
little to clarify the procedures of the Estates General, several modifications were adopted 
that not only framed voting practices throughout the revolutionary decade, but also set 
the stage for the debates that would arise regarding universal male suffrage during this 
period.42  
Crook explains that traditionally, the clergy and nobles were directly elected, but 
by 1789 the Third Estate was much too large for this. Consequently, it was decided that 
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members of the Third Estate would be elected through preliminary assemblies to ensure 
rural communities along with artisans and guilds could participate. On January 24, 1789, 
the Estates General issued an electoral statute that established a system of numerical 
representation. This statute made it so that the pays d’etats would be subjected to an 
electoral system composed of bailliages and sénéchaussées or administrative districts. 
Inhabitants of a bailliage would elect representatives to participate in a second set of 
elections to choose a representative for the Third Estate. Crook says: 
In this sense, the consultation was organic rather than democratic; as one 
historian puts it, ‘the electoral system was intended to represent groups rather 
than individuals.’ On the other hand, in the interests of ‘reason and equity,’ it was 
decided to award deputies to the baililages and sénéchaussées ‘according to their 
population and resources.43 
Though this was an innovation compared to the previous electoral system, Crook 
explains that it initially presented a problem. According to the January 24 statute, it was 
stipulated that each district could have two representatives for up to 200 voters and a 
maximum of four deputies in any district. At this point, electors had to be property 
owners. Consequently, a small rural community might have several representatives even 
though its property owning electors made up an infinitesimal portion of the population. 
Larger towns, by contrast, might have a single deputy for 400 electors. Hence, the small 
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towns would be grossly overrepresented at the secondary or bailliage level of 
elections.44  
In order to fix this, the Assembly of Notables imposed an additional decree that 
greatly increased the franchise throughout France. Crook says: 
Having secured their own position by preserving separate orders, the Notables 
were able to sponsor the subsequent decree that, in rural areas and towns alike, 
‘all inhabitants from the third estate, born in France or naturalized, aged twenty-
five years old and listed on the tax rolls’ would be given the opportunity to both 
vote and be elected.45  
This move on the part of the Assembly of Notables to enfranchise so many does signify 
a kind of transformation. The kings subjects were becoming citizens and active 
participants in a body politic.46 Nevertheless, Crook explains that it would be hasty to 
read these new election procedures as radically democratic.47 Enormous inequity 
persisted in spite of these changes. Elections that took place in villages were principally 
more democratic than those in urban areas. The electoral regulations for urban areas 
favored the bourgeoisie, permitting middle-class professionals like lawyers, doctors and 
ship owners (members of the corporations d'arts libéraux) twice as much representation 
as artisan guilds (corporations d'arts et métiers). Yet, access to village assemblies 
depended on the local structure of taxation, which was predicated on the structure of 
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landownership. If being included on the tax-roll meant paying a land tax (as was the case 
in Provence, for instance), then those who owned no land were denied access to the 
assemblies. Hence, wage-laborers, beggars, transients and other landless individuals 
were often excluded from participating in elections. In Paris, a cens or fiscal requirement 
was established for members of the Third Estate.48 Crook explains that although the cens 
in Paris far exceed the tax requirement elsewhere, it nevertheless “accurately reflected 
current intellectual opinion on the franchise.”49 Throughout France, the educated elite 
maintained that those whose occupation condemned them to poverty and lack of 
education were unfit for full participation in public affairs.50  
The 1789 Estates General election is significant because it set several precedents 
for the elections that would take place during the revolution. In establishing primary 
assemblies, the January 24 electoral statute set the stage for a representative rather than a 
direct democracy. Crook explains, however, that it also invited voters to express their 
collective will through a deputy. That is, deputies were no longer elected to represent 
their own will, but rather became responsible for acting as messengers who spoke on 
behalf of the community they represented.51 This, in turn, meant that secondary elections 
were to be a function of the will of local communities. Yet, the representative model for 
elections also enabled those who believed elected officials should be of an elite status to 
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impose this standard from above. Because local communities wanted the best 
representation, they tended to elect the best and most educated to represent them. The 
government stipulated that these deputies should be the most exceptional individuals of 
their community.52 Consequently, Crook says, “The elections of 1789 effectively served 
as a seed bed for the early revolutionary elite as well as social terms, all over the 
country.”53 Many of those who were elected to the Third Estate in 1789 eventually 
became members of the National Assembly and remained in political power for decades 
after the revolution. Restricting access to secondary assemblies through indirect 
elections thus worked to preserve the interests of elites, which calls into question the 
modern quality that is often attributed to elections during the French Revolution. In spite 
of this, however, the 1789 Estates General also established a uniquely broad franchise at 
the primary level. This would ultimately be retained throughout the revolutionary period, 
giving rise to debates regarding the extent to which limited and indirect suffrage were 
consistent with the broader aims of the revolution.54     
In late July of 1789, Sieyès introduced the terms “active citizenship” and 
“passive citizenship” to the National Assembly’s constitutional committee as a means of 
distinguishing between those who could vote and those who could not vote.55 Though 
Sieyès language was new, it clearly had its origin in the previous regimes’ electoral 
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system which separated voters and non-voters according to taxation and land-
ownership.56 Hence, the distinction was based on the same presupposition that those who 
could contribute financially to society were capable of fully participating in public life, 
while those who lacked such resources were not.  
These requirements are clearly expressed in the constitution that was ultimately 
adopted on September 3, 1791. This constitution stipulated an electoral process based on 
primary and electoral assemblies for the selection of representatives to the National 
Assembly. The National Assembly would be a permanent, single legislative body that 
could not be dissolved by the king and would be composed of representatives elected 
every two years.57 In all, the Assembly would have 745 representatives who were 
distributed across the kingdom’s 83 departments in proportion to the size of the 
departments’ territory, population, and direct tax.58 These representatives would be 
selected by electors chosen through primary assemblies.  
While the constitution defined citizenship in broad terms, only those who met the 
requirements for “active” citizenship were eligible to vote in primary assemblies within 
the cantons or various subdivisions of the departments of France. Active citizens had to 
satisfy the basic criteria for being French citizens.59 This alone, however, did not render 
individuals eligible to vote. To be an active citizen, it was necessary to be twenty-five 
years of age or older and a resident of the city or canton in which one intended to vote. 
Further, to qualify as an active citizen one had to pay a direct tax equal to a minimum of 
                                                
56 See Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, 14, 30-1.  
57 Constitution of 1791 (3 September 1791), AE/I/10, part 2a, Title III, Chapter I.2-5. 
58 Ibid, Title III, Chapter I, Section I.1-2. 
59 Ibid, Title II.2. 
35 
three days labor not including domestic labor, enlist in that municipality’s National 
Guard and take a civic oath.60 Only those who could prove that they met all of these 
requirements were allowed to vote in the primary assemblies.  
These primary assemblies would choose one elector for every 100 enfranchised 
people in a canton, two for every 151-200 people, and so on, to participate in electoral 
assemblies. In addition to being active citizens, electors had to meet certain property 
requirements that varied depending on the size of the canton in which they resided.61 
These electors were charged with the task of electing representatives from their 
department to serve in the National Assembly. Any active citizen, regardless of position, 
profession, or tax could be a national representative.62  
Limited franchise seemed to be in conflict with the idea of the people that was 
driving revolutionary action. Yet, Crook argues that there was little resistance to it early 
on, even by the most radical factions.63 Though many assume that the distinction 
between active and passive citizenship was politically explosive from the outset, he 
explains that the electoral practices of the Old Regime appear to have been too engrained 
for this to be the case in the early stages of the revolution. Consequently, there was little 
difficulty involved at first in allowing the past regime to determine voting eligibility. By 
1791, however, the requirements for voting had become so complicated that mass 
numbers of eligible voters opted to abstain rather than take the time to demonstrate their 
credentials. Consequently, Crook suggests that frustrations regarding voting emerged in 
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revolutionary France not because the franchise was limited but rather because of the 
overly demanding electoral system and a deteriorating political climate.64 He says, “In 
1791, electoral participation had become a test of loyalty to the regime which many 
voters, in rural areas in particular, were unwilling to take.”65 Thus, voter turnout 
plummeted in 1791. 
While this failed electoral process would ultimately lead to a republican 
constitution, Crook explains that the people were allowed to have a direct voice in the 
case of two referenda, the first concerning the Constitution of Year I (1793) and the 
second concerning the Constitution of Year III (1795). In both cases, and especially the 
1793 referendum, voter turnout was much higher than it had been. The Constitution of 
1793 was drafted in the aftermath of the king’s deposition and ultimate execution, along 
with the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1792. Consequently, the recently 
formed National Convention decided that a new constitution could only be adopted after 
being submitted to a popular vote.66 Hence, a constitutional referendum was sent to the 
primary assemblies. After extensive public debate, the first constitution of the Republic 
of France was accepted in 1793. In being based on the model of direct democracy, it 
provided a radical alternative to the Constitution of 1791. 
The constitution included a revised Declaration of the Rights of Man, which, in 
addition to declaring that the people were sovereign and had a fundamental right to 
insurrection, also established that all male citizens had an inalienable right to vote, 
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participate in legislation, and be elected to public office.67 Universal male suffrage had 
already been enacted in 1792 when all men age twenty-five or older were able to vote 
regardless of their social class in the National Convention elections.68 The Constitution 
of 1793 endorsed and further extended this practice of universal male suffrage. In 
addition to omitting the distinction between active and passive citizenship and 
suspending all fiscal requirements, it also reduced the voting age to twenty-one.69 
Further, it stipulated that both those born and living in France, as well as any alien who 
had lived and worked in France for a year, would be granted the rights of citizens. This, 
in turn, made it the case that even domestic servants, who had previously been excluded, 
were enfranchised.  
According to this constitution, the people were sovereign and would now choose 
their deputies directly, while electors would be responsible for choosing administrators 
and judges. Unlike the Constitution of 1791, the Constitution of 1793 stipulated no 
requirements for voting beyond living in one’s canton for at least six months. In 
asserting that “population is the only basis of national representation” the constitution 
thereby removed the electoral college that had previously been in place.70 In establishing 
popular sovereignty, it also determined that anyone who enjoyed the rights of French 
citizenship was eligible for election and those elected would represent the nation as a 
                                                
67 See Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (26 August 1789), AE/II/1129, 
Articles 1 and 25 (the people’s sovereignty), Article 35 (the right to insurrection), and 
Articles 5, 28, and 29 (the right to vote, legislate, and be elected to public office).  
68 See Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, 100. 
69 Constitution of 1793 or Year I (24 June 1793), AE/I/29, part 3, Article 4, 7-11.  
70 Ibid, Article 21.  
38 
whole.71 One deputy would be elected for every 40,000 citizens to serve on the National 
Assembly and the selection of these deputies would be determined by an absolute 
majority vote.72 Electoral assemblies, though absent from the process of selecting 
national representatives, were responsible for appointing candidates from their 
respective departments to serve on the executive council (the new executive branch of 
the government). This list of candidates would then be given to members of the 
Convention who would elect twenty four individuals to serve on the executive council.73 
The constitution was accepted on August 10, 1793, but Crook says that it was 
never fully implemented. By October of the same year, he explains that the Terror had 
become the order of the day and elections were indefinitely postponed.74 It was not until 
1795 that a new constitution was drafted. As a result of the Terror, there was widespread 
agreement among the deputies that the direct democracy established by the Constitution 
of 1793 should be replaced with a government that could preserve a just social order. 
This constitution was significant for several reasons. First, in an effort to prevent a single 
person or party from possessing too much executive power, the constitution established a 
“Directory” made up of five members who shared executive power. Further, it dissolved 
the National Convention and established a bicameral legislature composed of the 
Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Elders in an effort to slow down the process 
by which laws were passed. In addition to constituting the lower legislative house, the 
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Council of Five Hundred was responsible for proposing a list of candidates for the 
Directory to the Council of Elders who would then elect the five members.75  
 Given the civil strife and violence gripping the nation, Crook says, “Visions of 
equality were cast aside by the constitutional commission.”76 The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen was yet again revised. Unlike the previous Declaration, which 
emphasized the liberties of the people, this version divided the Declaration into rights 
and duties. While it asserted that men in society have the right to freedom, equality, 
liberty and property, it also obligated citizens to “do not unto others what you wish they 
should not do unto you [and] do unto others all the good you wish they should do unto 
you.”77 The constitutional commission was especially concerned by this point to put the 
property owning bourgeoisie back in power. Though the voting age remained at twenty-
one, the liberal naturalization policy of 1793 was reversed.78 Additionally, participation 
in primary assemblies required individuals to live in their canton for a year rather than 
six months, and, for the first time, only those who were able to read and write were 
allowed to participate in primary assemblies (though this would not be imposed until 
Year XII).79 While the language of “active” and “passive” citizenship was not used in 
the 1795 constitution, it nevertheless imposed fiscal requirements that implied as 
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much.80 The franchise was determined by what the constitution defined as “citizenship,” 
but citizenship required that individuals pay either a personal or a property tax.81 
Consequently, domestic servants, who had temporarily been allowed to vote, lost their 
ability to do so in 1795.82  
Insofar as it reinstituted a representative electoral process, the Constitution of 
1795 looked very similar to the Constitution of 1791. The primary assemblies would 
elect one elector to for every 200 citizens, two electors for 201 to 500 citizens, three 
electors for 501 to 700 citizens and four for 701 to 900 citizens to serve on their 
respective departmental electoral assemblies.83 These electors were then responsible for 
choosing the members of the Council of Five-Hundred and the Council of Elders, the 
members of the court, grand jury men, departmental administrators, the presidents, 
public attorneys and clerks of the criminal courts, and the judges of the civil courts.84 In 
effect, therefore, very little was left up to the people. 
In addition to undoing the power that had been granted to primary assemblies in 
1793, the Constitution of 1795 stipulated that members of the electoral assembly had to 
meet property requirements in addition to paying the tax all voters paid. Specifically, in 
communes with populations over 6,000 inhabitants, the constitution required that 
electors were the owners or the proprietors of an estate worth at least 100 days labor. In 
communes with fewer than 6,000 inhabitants, the constitution required that electors 
                                                
80 See Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, 117. 
81 Constitution of 1795 or Year III (22 August 1795/5 fructidor III), AE/I/10, part 12, 
Title II, Article 8.  
82 Ibid, Title III, Article 13.1. 
83 Ibid, Title IV, Article 33. 
84 Ibid, Title IV, Article 41.  
41 
owned or were the proprietors of estates that were equal in value to at least 150 days 
labor. For electors from the country, it was necessary that they either be the beneficiary 
or owner of an estate that was equal in value to wages of 150 days labor or that they 
were farmers or tenets of estates equal in value to 200 days labor.85  
This constitution, like the one before it, was submitted to the people. Yet, while 
the referendum passed upon being submitted to popular vote and the results of the 
election were made public, it is not clear how legitimate these results were. Crook 
explains that the procès-verbaux from many departments had not yet arrived when the 
results of the election were announced.86 Furthermore, it was declared that support had 
been given for all of the members of the Convention remain in power without being re-
elected, which prompted substantial resistance. Crook explains that those who revolted 
in response to the choice of the electorate on October 5, 1795 were easily put down and 
their sections abolished. Consequently, he says, “At best, the choice of the electorate had 
been unduly circumscribed. At worst, voters had been cheated in what ultimately 
amounted to a coup d’etat.”87 Though Crook argues that the Directory ultimately made 
important contributions to France’s “electoral apprenticeship,” it was nevertheless one of 
several occasions during the revolutionary period when the regime succeeded in 
frustrating the will of the people.88  
The question of enfranchisement clearly played a decisive role in determining 
how these constitutions were formulated. Further, the debates over the meaning of 
                                                
85 Ibid, Title IV, Article 35. 
86 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, 121 and 127. 
87 Ibid, 129.  
88 Ibid, 130. 
42 
citizenship and its relation to voting rights brings into relief the difficulty inherent in 
applying the ideal of universal rights to the political sphere. Yet, in remaining confined 
to the continent, Crook overlooks the events that were unfolding in Saint-Domingue 
alongside these debates. In particular, he fails to consider that in fact an election was 
held in accordance with the Constitution of Year I in Saint-Domingue. This election, 
which took place in September of 1793 sent representatives from Saint-Domingue to 
push for emancipation in the National Convention. In so doing, it set off a chain of 
events that would, for a brief period, bring the ideals of the French Revolution to bear on 
the political sphere.  
In what follows, I will consider this election in relation to the events leading up 
to Sonthonax’s Decree of General Liberty and the National Convention’s subsequent call 
for abolition throughout the Republic of France in 1794. In so doing, I will show that 
upon being emancipated, the enslaved men of Saint-Domingue were fully enfranchised 
under the radically democratic Constitution of Year I. Though Crook overlooks these 
events, I will argue that they not only shaped the trajectory of the revolution in Saint-
Domingue, but also made what can perhaps be understood as the most authentic 
contribution to France’s “apprenticeship in democracy” of the revolutionary period. 
Moreover, given that enfranchising the former slaves vastly extended the concept of 
universal emancipation beyond what had previously been imaged, I want to suggest that 
the radical impact of these events, though widely neglected, must be taken into account 
when evaluating the conservative turn of 1795 that took place in metropolitan France.  
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EMANCIPATION: 1793 AND 1794 IN SAINT-DOMINGUE 
As these changes unfolded in France, Saint-Domingue was undergoing its own 
tumultuous transformation on the other side of the Atlantic. The slave revolt that had 
begun there in 1791 was turning towards abolition by 1793. In 1792, the National 
Assembly had granted the rights of citizens to free people of color in an effort to unite 
them with the French commissioners against the slave insurrection. Though they 
remained outnumbered and overpowered by the strength of the insurgents, things began 
to change in May of 1793 when François-Thomas Galbaud, a decorated French 
revolutionary general and plantation owner, arrived in Cap Français.89 Galbaud had been 
sent to command the French troops in Le Cap, and given Galbaud’s sympathy for white 
plantation owners, Sonthonax and Polverel ordered him not to take any action once he 
arrived. Regardless of these orders, Galbaud began implementing his own agenda upon 
arriving, which threatened the position of the free people of color in the city and 
undermined the alliance that the commissioners had established with them.90 In light of 
this, the commissioners ordered Galbaud to return to France, and while he initially 
obeyed, the British and Spanish sailors of Le Cap convinced him to stay and lead an 
assault on the city.91  
Sonthonax and Polverel realized that even when united with the free people of 
color, their forces were no match for the attack Galbaud was mounting. Hence, on the 
evening of June 20, 1793, the commissioners sought the help of the thousands of black 
                                                
89 See Jeremy Popkin, A Concise History of the Haitian Revolution (New York: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011),  56.  
90 See Popkin, A Concise History of the Haitian Revolution, 56. 
91 Ibid, 57. 
44 
slaves in the city, promising their freedom in return.92 As Jeremy Popkin explains, this 
subsequently set off what would be the bloodiest urban conflict that took place in either 
metropolitan France or the Americas during the entire revolutionary period.93 At the end 
of three days of fighting Le Cap had been reduced to ashes, leaving between 3,000 and 
10,000 dead.94  
Though Sonthonax had originally proposed limited freedom to the slaves who 
fought against Galbaud, he realized that he could only gain support from the insurgents 
in the northern province, many of whom were aligned with the Spanish, by means of a 
complete emancipation proclamation.95 On August 29, 1793 Sonthonax thus issued his 
“Decree of General Liberty,” stating that “all nègres and mixed blood people currently 
in slavery are declared free to enjoy all the rights of French citizens.”96 In addition to 
this, the decree stipulated that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was to 
be put into effect throughout Saint-Domingue.97 Though some insurgents joined the 
French immediately after it was issued, many refused. Popkin says that initially, 
Toussaint and the other insurgent leaders “saw the proclamation of June 20 as a 
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desperate gamble by a defeated faction.”98 Further, these leaders were aligned with the 
Spanish at the time of the destruction of Le Cap, who had “persuaded them that promises 
made in the name of the revolutionary French government were of little value.”99 It was 
not until a year after this initial emancipation decree that Toussaint broke with the other 
insurgents and joined the side of the French. Laurent Dubois explains that upon learning 
in June of 1794 that the Sonthonax’s emancipation decree had been ratified by the 
National Convention, Toussaint turned against the Spanish and “began his rise toward 
the leadership of the new, emancipated, but still colonial Saint-Domingue.”100  
Popkin argues that the events of June 20 along with Sonthonax’s 1793 Decree 
changed the course of the Haitian Revolution. While the insurrection might have 
succeeded regardless, it was in virtue of these events that the French Republican 
tradition ultimately intersected with it in 1794.101 The ideals of the French Revolution 
had all but been ignored by the French in Saint-Domingue who, to this point, had 
remained invested in preserving the plantation society that had proven so profitable for 
metropolitan France. Though Toussaint eventually came to take seriously Sonthonax’s 
promise of emancipation, endorsing the ideals of the French Revolution for the sake of 
creating a “colony of citizens,” this outcome was by no means obvious or consistent with 
the original aims of the leaders of either revolution.102  
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It may be true, as Crook suggests, that no elections took place in France after the 
1793 constitution was accepted. Yet, the election that was held in Saint-Domingue on 
September 23, 1793, as well as the events that followed it, seem to provide a 
consummate expression of the ideals that the people in France were unable to fully enact 
through the vote.103 Sonthonax presided over this election with the intention of sending 
several representatives to serve in the National Convention as representatives of Saint-
Domingue. Some claim that the newly freed slaves participated in this election, and 
while Dubois explains that there is no proof of this, he says, “There were…among the 
electors as well as among the candidates, a number of gens de couleur.”104 This unique 
election resulted in the appointment of three whites, three men of color, and three blacks 
to represent Saint-Domingue in France. Of these nine, only three made it to France. 
Among them was Jean-Baptiste Belley, who had been born in Africa and enslaved as a 
child. Though he had been freed before 1789, his election to the Assembly was both 
unprecedented and evoked outrage among many who, in spite of their revolutionary zeal, 
did not believe former slaves were fit to wear a deputy’s uniform.105 Regardless of these 
hostilities, however, Belley and his fellow representatives, French official Louis Dufay 
and free man of color Jean-Baptiste Mills, were admitted to the National Convention on 
February 15, 1793.106  
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Dufay gave a speech to the convention in which he said that in response to 
Galbauld, who had attempted to overthrow the commissioners by giving his support to 
the royalist mulattos, the slaves rose up and defended the Republic. Dufay thus 
explained that “the courage of the nègres armed for the French cause foiled these 
treacherous projects. In exchange for their services, they demanded liberty, which was 
granted to them.”107 Dufay thus called on the Convention to “create new citizens for the 
Republic in order to oppose our enemies.”108 Though the Convention was persuaded in 
large part by the strategic benefit of this decision, a motion was made “not by temporary 
enthusiasm but by the principles of justice, faithful to the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man,” to abolish slavery throughout the French republic and allow those who fought for 
France to enjoy the full benefits of French liberty and equality.”109 A further motion was 
made to grant all free people of color throughout the French republic the same liberty 
and equality. In response to this, the transcript of these proceedings colorfully depicts the 
Convention breaking into tears and applause. It is also included in the transcript that 
Jeanne Odo, a women of African descent who often attended debates in the Convention, 
fainted upon hearing the law pronounced.110 One member asserts “until now our decrees 
of liberty have been selfish, and only for ourselves. But today we proclaim it to the 
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universe, and generations to come will glory in this decree; we are proclaiming universal 
liberty.”111 A final proposal was thus drawn up in the presence of several people of color 
including Belley and Mills that both ratified Sonthonax’s initial 1793 decree and 
extended this decree to the entire French Republic.  
In its final formulation, the proposal read, “The National Convention declares 
that slavery of the nègres is abolished in all the colonies; consequently, it decrees that all 
men living in the colonies, without distinction of color, are French citizens and enjoy all 
the rights guaranteed by the constitution.”112 Despite the enthusiasm with which this 
decree was ratified, the new law was accompanied by instructions from the Committee 
of the Colonies that the republican commissioners were to implement emancipation 
however they saw fit.  Dubois explains that with this, Sonthonax, Polverel, and 
eventually L’Ouverture set up a legal order to implement a new free society which both 
declared the slaves free while forcing them to keep working. Dubois says: 
New forms of racial exclusion became interwoven with the language of rights, 
forming a Republican racism that initiated a long French engagement with the 
problem of organizing colonial relationships within a colonial framework. The 
struggle for emancipation was, ultimately, only the first step in a broader struggle 
for freedom and full citizenship.113 
Dubois and Popkin are at odds with respect to the impact the insurgents had in 
bringing about emancipation. Popkin emphasizes the political and military benefits 
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emancipation had for the French, suggesting that it began as a fight between white 
factions and ended when French republicans realized that they could not remain in 
control of the colony without freeing the slaves. Dubois, by contrast, suggests that 
through their direct action, the insurgents of Saint-Domingue and the French Antilles 
more broadly played a direct role in reshaping the idea of citizenship and, in so doing, 
radicalized the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.114 Yet, both agree that 
regardless of the underlying causes of abolition, the decrees of 1793 and 1794 and the 
events that followed brought the tension between France’s colonial enterprise and its 
revolutionary mission to the forefront.  
While much has been done to show how the threat from below on the continent 
motivated the conservatism of the Constitution of Year III, the threat from below that 
emerged in 1794 in Saint-Domingue, and the impact this had on the conservative swing 
of 1795, has been widely overlooked. Hence, in Chapter III, I will consider the ways in 
which the events of 1793 and 1794, though triumphant for the inclusive ideals set forth 
in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, were nevertheless fleeting. 
Specifically, I will consider how these triumphs brought the danger of universal 
emancipation into relief for those in metropolitan France, so as to provoke the 
conservative turn of 1795. I then want to show how this ultimately barred the formerly 
enslaved from enacting their newly acquired political status through the vote in the 1796. 
When the elections of 1793 and 1796 in Saint-Domingue are taken together, the promise 
of inclusion that was expressed in the former can be understood as culminating in an act 
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of exclusion made manifest through the latter. As I will argue, this transition reveals that 
despite becoming enfranchised, a specter of exclusion persists for those who enter into 
political life after having been cast out.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE SPECTER OF EXCLUSION: ACOUNTING FOR THE 1796 ELECTION IN CAP  
 
FRANÇAIS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In August of 1793, Léger Félicité Sonthonax issued a “Decree of General 
Liberty” in the colony of Saint-Domingue, granting all those who had been enslaved the 
rights of French citizens.115 Immediately thereafter, legislative elections were held in the 
colony to choose several deputies to represent Saint-Domingue in the French National 
Convention. Upon arriving in France, the deputies were admitted to the Convention and, 
on February 4, 1794, participated in the decision to ratify Sonthonax’s decree and 
abolish slavery throughout the Republic of France. Furthermore, it appears to be the only 
election that took place under the radical Constitution of Year I, which enacted a system 
of direct democracy and extended universal male suffrage throughout the Republic. 
Hence, while the election of 1793 might have been a political tactic on the part of 
Sonthonax, it nevertheless appears to have both participated in and opened up new 
possibilities for the ideal of the people that had come to captivate revolutionary France 
during this period.  
While many make mention of the 1793 election, few have considered the one 
that followed it in 1796. In this chapter, I will draw attention to it to show that it was as 
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significant as the 1793 election, insofar as it culminated in the betrayal of the ideals that 
had so virulently been endorsed several years before. The 1796 election provided the 
first opportunity for those who had been enfranchised in 1794 to fully activate their 
newly acquired French citizenship through the vote. Yet, the Constitution of 1795 (Year 
III), which re-imposed a system of representation and a fiscal requirement for both 
voting and participating in electoral assemblies, summarily barred the vast majority of 
those who had been enfranchised from participating in this election.  
I will begin by considering the political and military dynamics in Saint-
Domingue that set the stage for this election. Though the republican forces in Saint-
Domingue had been surprisingly successful in regaining control of the island by 1796, 
the colony was nearly torn asunder by racial conflict between the newly freed slaves in 
the north and the gens de couleur in the south. These tensions were only exacerbated by 
the arrival of Sonthonax and his new commission in May of 1796 meaning that the 
election of 1796 took place under particularly tense circumstances. I will then turn to the 
assembly transcript, both to outline how this election was portrayed in the official record 
and to provide a pivot point for examining several interpretations of it including those 
offered during the 1797 debates in Paris. This, in turn, will help illustrate how the 
debates between those who both supported and rejected emancipation shaped the way in 
which the story of this election was told.  
My broader aim in this chapter is to suggest by way of the 1796 election that the 
ideological story of the French Revolution can be understood more fully by examining 
the tension between the ideals of the French Republic and its colonial enterprise. The 
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Constitution of 1795 not only imposed a limited franchise, but also united the metropole 
and colonies under one law. Given this, it seems that the desire to remain invested in the 
colonies while mitigating the threat that hundreds of thousands of former slaves with 
political rights posed to this enterprise could have easily played a role in the turn away 
from universal suffrage in 1795. Yet, because the colonial narrative so frequently gets 
left out, its impact on the continent and the broader implications of this for 
understanding the Age of Revolution gets covered over.  
I therefore want to de-center the European story by turning to the 1796 election 
in Saint-Domingue. In so doing, I will argue that this election can be understood as an 
unprecedented moment in the history of emancipation, but not because it was a triumph 
for democracy, the people, or the ideals of the revolutionary period. Rather, it revealed 
that upon entering into political community, the threat of betrayal remained present for 
those who had once been excluded. In the final portion of my discussion, I will turn to 
the work of Mimi Sheller to provide an account of the effect of this specter of exclusion. 
In suggesting that complete assimilation to the French ideals was impossible, 
L’Ourverture’s fall in 1802 led to Dessalines’ call for a violent break from the colonial 
past. What became apparent in the nineteenth century, however, was that this past could 
not be overcome in its entirety. That is, the period after independence revealed that the 
tension the 1796 election exposed for those who became enfranchised was, to a certain 
extent, irresolute. While complete assimilation proved to be impossible, so too did 
complete revolution.  
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THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN SAINT-DOMINGUE 
BETWEEN 1794 AND 1796  
 In 1794, Sonthonax was arrested and recalled to France. The arrest came in 
response to a campaign made by angry colonists who had been deported from the colony 
and sent to Paris.116  Though the colonists in Paris had begun waging this campaign 
before 1792, they eventually gained enough strength in the National Convention to issue 
a decree for the commissioners’ recall on the grounds that they were “tyrannizing the 
citizens of Saint-Domingue.”117  
Upon leaving the colony in 1794, the commissioners feared that Spanish and 
British forces would succeed in expelling the French from the colony. In addition to this, 
the National Convention had shown little interest in preserving their stake in Saint-
Domingue. As Robert Stein explains:  
No replacements were sent for Sonthonax and Polverel, nor was any aid offered 
to the hard-pressed republican armies in the colony. The French were apparently 
too busy digesting the implications of the fall of Robespierre to concern 
themselves with Saint-Domingue and from 1794 when Sonthonax returned to 
Saint-Domingue, the colony was almost in total isolation.118  
When they left Saint-Domingue, the colony had been divided in three among the French, 
Spanish, and British, each of which depended heavily on the support of nonwhite forces 
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whose leaders had been inclined to switch sides without warning.119 Though this, along 
with disease and treachery from slave owners who would show loyalty to anyone willing 
to protect their plantations, hurt the British and Spanish troops, both were being 
supported by their respective governments. The French, by contrast, were not.120  
Yet, by this point Toussaint L’Ouverture had abandoned the Spanish and British 
for the sake of “liberty and equality,” effectively using the slogan of republicanism to 
rally the new French citizens.121 When the commissioners left, L’Ouverture was the 
commander of the republican troops in the northern province, while his fellow general, 
André Rigaud led republic troops in the south. Though both were required to report to 
the interim governor of the colony, Etienne Laveaux, they were, for all intents and 
purposes, under their own jurisdiction. By November of 1795, Rigaud had expelled the 
British from large portions of the south and west and had re-established the production 
of colonial commodities.122 The Spanish in the north and west were unable to hold their 
position against L’Ouverture’s forces. Matters were only made worse for the Spanish 
when Jean-François, an insurgent leader who had sided with the Spanish, retired and 
withdrew his troops from the north. In so doing, he left L’Ouverture and his French 
forces to gain control of the north, and thus, Stein says, “By the time Sonthonax and the 
third civil commission arrived in Floréal IV (May 1796), the Spanish seemed to offer 
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little danger to the Republic.”123 1795 can therefore be characterized as a year of 
enormous military success for France in Saint-Domingue, despite metropolitan France’s 
apathy towards this endeavor and thanks to the efforts of the Rigaud and L’Ouverture.124  
As these events unfolded in Saint-Domingue, France decided to renew its interest 
in their colonial territories. In late January, 1796 the newly formed Directory decided to 
send eleven agents to the colonies with the task of restoring confidence in the Republic 
and ensuring that France would profit from abolition by returning the former slaves to 
work. The Directory appointed Sonthonax to the third commission of the Saint-
Domingue, as he appeared to be the only Frenchman who could cultivate loyalty to the 
Republic among the former slaves. The Directory acknowledged that white colonists 
were opposed to Sonthonax for emancipating the slaves and deporting them from Saint-
Domingue. Yet, the executives in Paris also understood that they could not succeed in 
Saint-Domingue without the support of the former slaves. Nonwhites vastly 
outnumbered whites, and now, under the control of L’Ouverture and Rigaud, they had 
proven to be the most successful and powerful force in the colony.125 Therefore, despite 
the bitter feelings between white colonists and Sonthonax, the Directory made him the 
center of the commission for the sake of stabilizing the colony and enhancing its 
profitability under the banner of French republicanism.   
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Meanwhile, however, things were not going as well in Saint-Domingue as those 
in metropolitan France believed. In contrast to 1795, 1796 was characterized by racial 
strife between the ex-slaves and the free men of color.126 Needless to say, the 
extraordinary brutality that white plantation owners exercised against enslaved Africans 
had given rise to severe racial tension between these two groups. Beyond this, however, 
there was also tension between free men of color and enslaved Africans. The term “free 
men of color” or “gens de couleur libres” referred specifically to those of mixed 
heritage. By contrast, freed African slaves, like L’Ouverture and Belley, were called 
affranchis.127 The former had been disenfranchised and racially oppressed by the French. 
Yet, in being the kin of their masters, they were often freed and thus came to form a 
racial caste that was distinct from and taken to be superior to the caste that the enslaved 
occupied. For this reason, the gens de couleur in Saint-Domingue took themselves, and 
not the formerly enslaved, to be rightful heirs to the island.128 Hence, having been 
granted the full rights of French citizenship on August 4, 1792, they were uneasy about 
the position they found themselves in after 1794. Despite having once been regarded as 
key to the Republic’s success in Saint-Domingue, the gens de couleur were now being 
blamed for each set back it faced. This, of course, generated deep mistrust and 
animosity, as they took themselves to be staunch defender’s of liberty and unwavering 
supporters of the metropole.129  
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In particular, the old freemen felt threatened by L’Ouverture’s close relationship 
with Governor Laveaux, who “sided with the new freedmen for humanitarian and 
political reasons.”130 Those who had been freed in 1794, by contrast, worried that the old 
freemen would attempt to reinstate slavery, Thus, while the nonwhite forces of Saint-
Domingue had triumphed rather momentously over the British and Spanish, they now 
faced an internal power struggle between the citizens of April 4, 1792 and the citizens of 
April 29, 1793. In taking control of the south, Rigaud effectively established a secure 
territory for the gens de couleur and was particularly hostile towards both blacks and 
whites throughout the region. According to CLR James, “No black held rank above that 
of captain, and, unlike L’Ouverture, Rigaud kept whites in rigid subjection, excluding 
them from every position of importance.”131 Though at first, this sentiment was confined 
to the south, it ultimately came to a head in March of 1796 when Jean-Louis Villatte, a 
free man of color, attempted a coup in Le Cap. 
Villatte was the commandant of Cap Français, having played an integral role in 
restoring order after Galbaud had tried to seize Le Cap.132 He, like many of his fellow 
free men of color, were suspicious of the French and L’Ouverture for taking the side of 
the newly freed slaves, particularly as they believed this was having a negative impact 
on colonial commerce.133 Like L’Ouverture and Rigaud, Villatte was technically under 
the jurisdiction of Governor Laveaux. However, Laveaux had effectively been 
prohibited from leaving Port-au-Paix, meaning Villatte was able to govern Le Cap 
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without Laveaux’s interference.134 James says, “Laveaux loved the blacks for their own 
sake, and he loved L’Ouverture for the services he had rendered and because he was 
L’Ouverture.”135 Stein explains, by contrast, that “Villatte’s rule openly favored the free 
men of color, and as early as Germinal III (March 1795), Laveaux complained to the 
commission des colonies of his ‘insubordination.’”136 Upon recognizing the threat that 
L’Ouverture posed to the old freemen’s desire to declare independence, Villatte 
attempted a coup d’etat on March 26, 1796.137 Laveaux was arrested and detained for 
two days, during which Villatte was appointed Governor of Saint-Domingue.  
This plot, however, lost ground quickly. L’Ouverture was keenly aware that the 
leaders of the free men of color desired to take control in the north and declare 
independence from France at the expense of the newly freed slaves.138 Moreover, he and 
Laveaux seemed to share a deep affection for one another that was oriented by their 
mutual effort to ensure the formerly enslaved remained both free and French.139  Hence, 
L’Ouverture had men ready to intercept Villatte when he decided to attack. After 
Laveaux was released by republican troops, Villatte fled and L’Ouverture arrived soon 
after. Laveaux named L’Ouverture lieutenant governor for his loyalty to the Republic, a 
decision that was popular among whites and blacks in Le Cap and despised by those who 
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supported Villatte.140 As Bernard Gainot says, “This central episode in the evolution of 
the colony would be followed by the election of Laveaux as deputy of Saint-Domingue 
to the Metropolitan assemblies, and then his departure to France on October, 19 
1796.”141 Laveaux, in his loyalty to L’Ouverture, ultimately played a key role in shaping 
the 1797 debates in Paris through his defense of emancipation against the planters who, 
by this time, had aligned themselves with the gens de couleur for the sake of reinstating 
slavery.142  
Despite the animosity that the Villatte Affair generated, there was potential for 
amelioration between the revolutionary leaders in Saint-Domingue. Commissioner 
Roume, who had been appointed by the Directory to oversee the former Spanish territory 
of the colony, recognized this tension when he arrived in April of 1796. He wrote a letter 
to all of the generals on the island in the wake of the Villatte Affair, requesting that they 
put the past behind them and behave like good republicans.143 Thomas Madiou says that 
this letter seemed to have convinced the leaders that it was in their best interest to 
reconcile, and for a brief moment in 1796 there was peace among them. With the arrival 
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of Sonthonax, however, it was quickly lost. As Madiou explains, “[The republican 
leaders] perhaps could have maintained this for a long time if the arrival of Sonthonax, 
who was less conciliatory than Roume and more severe in his principles, had not 
reignited all of these passions.”144 Sonthonax was not a friend of the gens de couleur. 
Having clearly expressed this during his previous stay, he arrived in Saint-Domingue 
harboring similar feelings towards those in the south.  
 Sonthonax and the rest of the commission arrived in Cap Français on May 11, 
1796, two months after Villatte had attempted to seize power. Stein explains that upon 
leaving France, Sonthonax and his fellow commissioners had been charged with the task 
of  “[proclaiming] in all languages spoken on the island the abolition of slavery and the 
institution of liberty and equality.”145 Along with this, the commission was required to 
reform the administration of the island by dividing it into departments, taking a census 
and conducting surveys to improve communication between the west and east portions 
of the island. Finally, they were ordered to prevent racial tension as far as possible and 
eradicate “British tyranny” throughout the West Indies by invading Jamaica.146 Yet, the 
delicate political and racial climate that the Villatte affair had produced would ultimately 
make accomplishing these tasks exceptionally difficult. Furthermore, while France had 
promised to deliver troops and weapons to Saint-Domingue to help the commission 
carry out its tasks, these resources never arrived.  
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Upon landing in Le Cap, Sonthonax learned of the Villatte affair and, despite the 
reconciliatory efforts of Roume, swiftly intervened by having Villatte and his major 
supporters captured and deported to France. Aware of the dynamic between the gens de 
couleur libres and the affranchis, his intention seemed to be ensure that Saint-Domingue 
remained French. Moreover, Sonthonax took it to be of utmost importance to punish 
Villatte for expressing hostility towards the affranchis. Any attack on the affranchis, 
Sonthonax believed, was a deliberate attack on the principles of liberty and equality that 
guided the Republic.147 The swift and severe manner in which Sonthonax intervened in 
the Villatte Affair, however, only amplified the animosity of the free men of color and 
was considered by some to be a catalyst for a new era of racial strife in Saint-
Domingue.148 The danger of Sonthonax’s actions consisted not so much in Villatte’s 
ability to retaliate, but rather in the fact that so many gen de couleur throughout Saint-
Domingue had similar aspirations.149 If Sonthonax was to retain the colony for the 
Republic, he needed Rigaud and the free men of color to remain loyal to France, which 
they had done to this point.  
Sonthonax sent three agents to the south to encourage Rigaud to continue serving 
the Republic, but the delegation failed by making too many administrative changes, 
arresting Rigaud’s supporters, and relentlessly criticizing Rigaud himself for failing to 
endorse the principles of liberty and equality. In late July of 1796, the delegates’ actions 
prompted Rigaud to refuse to support either the French or the British, instead setting out 
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on his own path towards independence. By the end of the summer Rigaud no longer 
wanted anything to do with the French and the south became a place where the April 4 
citizens reigned supreme. As a result, the agents had to abandon their efforts to secure 
the south for the Republic.150  
Meanwhile in the north, Sonthonax was working hard to ensure that L’Ouverture 
remained loyal to the French.151 In addition to sending L’Ouverture’s two sons to France 
to be educated, which L’Ouverture had requested, Sonthonax helped raise his rank in the 
army, rewarding him for his conduct in the Villatte affair despite having arrived after the 
flame was put out.152 L’Ouverture became the successor to Laveaux as commander-in-
chief of Saint-Domingue and the commander of the west. With this, however, Sonthonax 
gave L’Ouverture orders to reclaim the town of Mirebalais from the British. This town 
was strategically important because whoever controlled it also controlled communication 
between the north and the south and between Port-au-Prince and Spanish Santo 
Domingo.153 In addition to this, sending L’Ouverture to Mirebalais meant keeping him 
away from Cap Français long enough for Sonthonax to hold an election in Cap Français. 
These tumultuous conditions set the stage for the election that took place in 1796.  
If these elections had been conducted according to the letter of the law, then 
primary assemblies would have been held in each canton of Saint-Domingue on  
Germinal 1 (March 21). These assemblies would have chosen electors to serve in the 
electoral assembly for their department. They also would have appointed a justice of the 
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peace, and a president or municipal officers for their municipality.154  All men over the 
age of twenty-one who had been inscribed on a civic register in their canton and had 
paid a direct or personal property tax would have counted as a French citizen and been 
able to vote at the primary level.155 Anyone who had fought for the French Republic 
would have also qualified as a French citizen and been able to vote in the primary 
assemblies.156  
Theses primary assemblies would have named one elector for cantons with two hundred 
to three hundred eligible voters, two for cantons with three hundred to five hundred 
eligible voters, three for every five hundred to seven hundred eligible voters, and four 
for every seven hundred to nine hundred eligible voters.157  
Had the election procedures of the Constitution of 1795 been followed, these 
electors would have been at least twenty-five years old and would have met a property or 
income requirement that varied according to the size of their canton. Electoral 
assemblies would have then convened on Germinal 20 (April 9) to appoint deputies to 
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the Legislative Corps in Paris, department directors, high-jurors, and several other high-
ranking positions.158  
 Thus, in theory those who were eligible to vote at the primary level should have 
been recorded in the civic registers. Moreover, there should have been procès verbaux 
for the primary assemblies, a list of the electors who were chosen, and the procès verbal 
for the electoral assembly. Given that Saint-Domingue was in the throes of civil war, it is 
unlikely that things unfolded in such an orderly way. However, there is no way to be 
certain, as the primary source base is extremely limited. In light of these limitations, I 
will consider the orderly picture that was painted in the surviving transcript of the 
electoral assembly, alongside the more chaotic account Madiou offers. I will then 
consider the debates that took place in regard to the legitimacy of this election in the 
1797 Legislative Corps. In so doing, my aim will be to give contour to this story for the 
sake of opening up broader questions later on regarding the meaning of citizenship and 
the ideal of universal emancipation.   
THE 1796 ELECTION IN CAP FRANÇAIS 
Before elections were held in Le Cap in September of 1796, Madiou suggests 
that another set of elections had already been conducted on the island earlier that year. 
He explains that in April of 1796, after Rigaud’s forces successfully defeated the British 
in Léogâne, a city in the west of Saint-Domingue, he and Bauvais, his fellow general 
from the south who had helped secure this victory, decided to call primary assemblies to 
appoint electors to electoral assemblies that would then appoint deputies to the 
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Legislative Corps in Paris. According to Madiou, Rigaud had not yet officially received 
the Constitution of 1795, but decided to proceed anyway as a means of expressing his 
disregard for Laveaux’s position as governor of Saint-Domingue.159 Two electoral 
assemblies convened, one in Léogâne to appoint representatives from the west and one 
in Les Cayes to appoint representatives from the south. The assemblies appointed a 
diverse slate of deputies that included a handful of gens de couleur, several whites, and 
one black to serve in the Legislative Corps.160 Though this election took place in April, 
the newly named deputies from the south and west did not plan to depart for Paris until 
September, 1796 at the same time that the electoral assembly was taking place in Le 
Cap.161  
Madiou says that holding this election in April was a clear act of resistance on 
the part of Rigaud, and if things had gone as Rigaud had planned, the Haitian Revolution 
would have unfolded very differently after 1796. In addition to holding these elections 
independent of Laveaux’s orders, Rigaud sent his aide-de-camp, Bonnet, with the 
deputies elect to justify the charge that Sonthonax was attempting to secure Saint-
Domingue’s independence for the citizens of August 29.162 Rigaud was eager to take 
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advantage of the conservative swing in Paris and seemed to have his sights set on 
reinstituting slavery for the sake of returning the island to its previous state of 
profitability. Colonists in Paris who were angry with Sonthonax for emancipating the 
slaves and deporting them, had gained power in the Legislative Corps.163 Hence, Madiou 
suggests that the political climate in the metropole was ideal for Rigaud to take control.  
Unfortunately for Rigaud, however, his deputies were captured by the British while en 
route, which prevented them from finishing their trip to Paris.164  
It seems, then, that Rigaud and Sonthonax were in a race to send representatives 
to Paris to defend their respective causes, which helps to illustrate the underlying 
motivation for the September election, as well as the importance of this election for 
shaping the trajectory of the Haitian Revolution. According to the transcript, the 
electoral assembly convened in Le Cap on September 7, 1796 (21 Fructidor of Year IV). 
When the first session began, Citizen Duval, the most senior member of the electorate, 
presided over the assembly as president, and Citizen Vergniaud, the youngest member, 
performed the duties of secretary.165 A vote would be cast by the end first session to 
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reassign Vergniaud to the role of President and Duval to Secretary, and the sessions 
would be led by Vergniaud for the duration of the assembly.166  
As would be the case with each session that was recorded in the transcript, this 
day began with a reading of the French law of 1794 and 1795 regarding electoral 
procedures.167 The President cited a decree given on September 22, 1794 (1 Vendémiaire 
Year III), which called for the convocation of an electoral assembly in the departments 
of France. He then gave a reading of the laws stipulated by the Constitution of 1795 
regarding election procedures.168  
The election procedures outlined in the Constitution of 1795 (Year III) re-
imposed a limited franchise, as well as a system of representation for voting. The 
Constitution of 1793 (Year I), which was in place when the National Convention ratified 
Sonthonax’s Decree of General Liberty, had removed the financial requirements for 
suffrage that had been in place in 1789, thereby giving all French citizens age 21 or older 
the right to vote.169 It had further stipulated that the people would elect their national 
representatives directly rather than through a system of primary and electoral 
assemblies.170 In addition to enacting universal suffrage and a direct democracy the 
Constitution of 1793 stipulated that any French citizen could be elected as a national 
representative.171 While this had been true of the Constitution of 1791, the system of 
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representation had ensured that only the most elite were elected to the National 
Assembly.172  
By contrast, the Constitution of 1795 sought to drastically curb the power of the 
people. This constitution reinstated a system of representation and indirect elections, 
whereby the citizens with the right to vote would choose electors in primary assemblies 
to represent their canton at the departmental level in electoral assemblies.173 
Furthermore, it imposed a tax-based franchise on citizens at the primary level of 
elections and established a property requirement for all electors at the secondary level.174 
The Constitution of 1795 also had powerful implications for the colonies, as it declared 
that they were to be treated as a part of metropolitan France, each one constituting a 
department of the nation rather than a satellite entity under its own jurisdiction.175 In so 
doing, it fully integrated the colonies into the legal and political structure of France.  
On the one hand, this was beneficial for the formerly enslaved as it solidified 
emancipation throughout the colonies, preventing any colonial administrator from 
reinstituting slavery. On the other, the limited definition of citizenship that was 
established by this constitution prohibited the vast majority of former slaves from 
participating in the election.176 This is significant as it suggests that there could have 
been a relationship between departmentalization and the voting restrictions of 1795.  
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Considering these restrictions alongside the fact that the Constitution of Year III 
united the metropole and colonies under the law of the French republic, this limited 
franchise appears not only to be a response to the threat from below on the continent, but 
also from the threat posed by granting political rights to hundreds of thousands of former 
slaves in the colonies. Given previous events, it seems likely that the Convention would 
have recognized that they could only retain their colonial possessions if they kept the 
rabble out of politics. Furthermore, as there was sustained debate in Paris regarding the 
uprising in Saint-Domingue and the fate of the colonies from 1792 through 1797, it in 
fact seems unlikely that the colonies would not have had an impact on the framing of the 
Constitution of 1795. Hence, the newly enfranchised citizens of Saint-Domingue would 
have been subject in 1796 to the voting restrictions imposed by the Constitution of Year 
III that could very well have been a consequence of their effort to adhere to the 
principles of universal emancipation from 1794 on.  
A small number of those who had been emancipated in 1794, including soldiers 
fighting for the Republic and former slaves who might have been able to make the 
necessary fiscal contribution, were legally allowed to vote.177 In fact, Victor Hugues, the 
colonial commissioner of Guadalupe, suggested in 1796 that some affranchis 
participated in the election at the primary level, though he argues that they were 
manipulated by local officials to cast ballots for certain candidates.178 In spite of this, the 
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plantation policies that had been imposed by Polverel in 1794 and further extended by 
L’Ouverture over the next several years greatly limited the ability of former slaves to 
participate in politics by 1796. Polverel’s policies established that all abandoned 
plantations were to be sequestered by the state, meaning the formerly enslaved were 
prevented from laying claim to them.179 In 1795, L’Ouverture prohibited former slaves 
from choosing not to work. After L’Ouverture issued this decree in 1795, Dubois says, 
“The propertyless ex-slaves…were order to return to their plantations within twenty-four 
hours. They would be paid a salary for their work, but they did not have the freedom to 
say no.”180 Hence, those who had been granted the rights of French citizens in 1794 were 
not only confined to low-wage plantation work but also prohibited from becoming 
property owners and, by implication, electors in the electoral assemblies.181 As these 
limitations were constitutive of a broader belief that the formerly enslaved were unfit for 
politics, it comes as no surprise that few overall, and even fewer ex-slaves, likely voted 
in the election of 1796.182  
                                                                                                                                           
participation, so it is possible that he told this story to advance his own agenda in 
Guadeloupe.  
179 See Etinne Polverel, “The Plantation Policies of Etinne Polverel 1794,” Slave 
Revolution in the Caribbean 1789-1804: A Brief History with Documents,138-144.  
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182 Ibid, 205.  
72 
In spite of this, however, the historical record does indicate that primary 
assemblies began convening after Sonthonax’s commission decreed on August 6, 1796 
(19 Thermidor Year IV) that elections would take place in the north.183 Between August 
18 and September 1, primary assemblies were held in twenty-nine cantons throughout 
Saint-Domingue. According to the assembly transcript, for every two hundred citizens in 
a canton who had the right to vote, one elector was chosen by absolute majority to serve 
in the electoral assembly.184 Within these twenty-nine cantons, 24,200 citizens were 
eligible to vote. It is worth noting that the procès verbaux only reflect the number of 
eligible voters and not the number of citizens who did vote. Hence, the number of voters 
was likely far lower than this. Nevertheless, those who did vote named a total of 118 
electors to the electoral assembly (see table 1).  
 
                                                
183 Sonthonax Papers (19 Thermidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “Copie du procès 
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184 Electoral assembly transcript, BNF, ms 8696, 44 and Constitution of 1795 or Year III 
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Table 1 Procès verbaux of the primary assemblies in Saint-Domingue (1796)185 
Canton of Saint-
Domingue 
Number of citizens 
with the right to vote 
Number of electors 
named 
Date of primary 
assembly 
1. Cap Français  
2. Petite-Anse 
3. Haut du Cap  
4. Trou 
5. Fort-liberté 
6. Terrier-Rouge 
7. Limbé 
8. Port-Margot 
9. St. Louis du Nord 
10. Port-au-Paix 
11. Port Vincent 
12. Gros-Morne 
13. Gonaïves 
14. Petite Rivière 
15. Verrettes 
16. Grand-Rivière 
17. Plaisance  
18. Marmelade 
19. Dondon 
3000  
1200  
1200 
200 
800 
200 
1000 
600 
600 
1000 
400 
800 
1600 
2400 
200 
200 
600 
1000 
600 
12  
6 
6 
1 
4 
1 
5 
3 
3 
5 
2 
4 
8 
12 
1 
1 
3 
5 
3 
18, 19 Aug. 1796  
19 Aug. 1796 
18 Aug. 1796  
29 Aug. 1796 
28 Aug. 1796 
26 Aug. 1796 
30 Aug. 1796 
27 Aug. 1796 
18 Aug. 1796 
21, 23 Aug. 1796 
22 Aug. 1796 
26 Aug. 1796 
18 Aug. 1796 
18 Aug. 1796 
21 Aug. 1796 
19 Aug. 1796 
27 Aug. 1796 
24 Aug. 1796 
2 Sept. 1796 
                                                
185 Electoral assembly transcript, BNF, ms 8696, 44-6.  
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Canton of Saint-
Domingue 
Number of citizens 
with the right to vote 
Number of electors 
named 
Date of primary 
assembly 
20. Jacquemel 
21. Beynet 
22. Léogâne 
23. Grand-Goâve 
24. Acquin 
25. Cayes-Jacquemel 
26. Jean-Rabel 
27. Petit-Goâve 
28. Borgne 
29. St. Michel 
800 
600 
600 
400 
600 
800 
600 
800 
1000 
400 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
2 
28 Aug. 1796 
28 Aug. 1796 
28 Aug. 1796 
28 Aug. 1796 
28 Aug. 1796 
29 Aug. 1796 
27 Aug. 1796 
27 Aug. 1796 
18, 19 Aug. 1796 
1 Sept. 1796 
Total 24,200 118 Adopted 7-13 Sept. 
1796 
 
 
Proceeding in accordance with the new law of 1795, the president of the assembly spent 
the first day of the assembly adopting the procès verbaux from various cantons of Saint-
Domingue, which, in turn, gave the electors the right to vote in the assembly. 186 Electors 
from twenty-three of the twenty-nine cantons, ninety-seven electors in all, were admitted 
to the assembly as voting members on September 7.  The twenty-one electors from the 
                                                
186 Sonthonax Papers (21 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “Copie du procès 
verbal” through “trois electeurs.” 
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additional six cantons, who arrived late to the assembly, were eventually admitted as 
voting members in subsequent sessions.187  
 The session of the electoral assembly reopened on the morning of September 8 
(22 Fructidor). With Vergniaud now acting as president, the assembly proceeded to vote 
on the thirteen deputies who had previously served as national representatives. During 
this session, Belley, Dufay and Mills were re-elected to represent Saint-Domingue in 
Paris.188 On September 9 (23 Fructidor), the third day of the assembly, thirty nine more 
deputies who had been nominated to represent departments in metropolitan France were 
confirmed. The fourth and fifth days of the assembly were thus devoted to electing six 
new deputies to serve on the Legislative Corps in Paris as representatives of Saint-
Domingue.  
 The assembly transcript indicates that on September 10 (24 Fructidor), two new 
citizens were nominated for the deputy positions in the Legislative Corps. The first was 
Citizen Chaunany, an elector for Le Cap.189 The second was Sonthonax. According to 
the transcript, Sonthonax had sent a letter to the assembly in which he both accepted his 
nomination and offered a defense for why he desired to leave Saint-Domingue. In this 
letter, he explained that the people of Saint-Domingue had proven capable of defending 
liberty without his help. However, he said: 
In France, on the contrary, the colonial faction…rallied for my absence; already, 
your old tyrant has gotten around several influential members of the legislature. 
                                                
187 Sonthonax Papers, AN Paris D/XXV 424, “Copie du procès verbal” through “trois 
electors,” “majorité absolute,” and “les loix.”  
188 Sonthonax Papers (22 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “Mars Belley.” 
189 Sonthonax Papers (23 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “du matin.” 
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It is finally time for the banner of this error to be torn down and I swear…that I 
will not spare my struggle, my sacrifice, to ensure these principles triumph and 
their enemies are brought down.190 
 With this, Sonthonax declared that in an effort to preserve the freedom that had been 
achieved in Saint-Domingue, he felt it was his duty to return to France as a deputy.191  
 Having nominated two of the six deputies, the assembly reconvened the 
following morning, September 11 (25 Fructidor), to nominate four more deputies. 
During this session, Laveaux was chosen, along which Citizen Petigniaud an elector for 
Beynet, Citizen Brottier, elector for Petite Rivière, and Citizen Boiron Jeune, elector of 
Acquin.192 On September 12 (26 Fructidor), the sixth session, the assembly elected 
Citizen Barbaut to be the high juror of Saint-Domingue. Finally, on the seventh day, the 
assembly completed its deliberations when Barbaut accepted his nomination.193    
THE LEGISLATIVE DEBATES OF 1797 
Despite his impassioned letter to the electoral assembly, Sonthonax did not set 
sail for Paris until 1797 when L’Ouverture forced him to leave Saint-Domingue. 
Furthermore, those who had been elected, including Laveaux, were unable to take up 
                                                
190 [En France, au contraire, la cabale colonial dispensée par mes soins, se rallie depuis; 
déjà vou ancien tyrans ont circonvenu quelques membres influent dela legislature, il est 
temps enfin que le bandeau de l’erreur soit totalement déchiré, et je jure…que je 
n’eparguerai mi peines, mi sacrifices, pour que les principes triomphent et que leurs 
enemis soient terrassés.] Sonthonax Papers (24 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424.  
191 Sonthonax Papers (24 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424.  
192 Sonthonax Papers (25 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “16. Eteinne 
Laveaux.”  
193 Sonthonax Papers (26 Fructidor an IV), AN Paris D/XXV 424, “un expedition.” 
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their posts in the Legislative Corps because the election in Le Cap had been annulled.194 
The disgruntled colonists, led by Viénot Vaublanc, a planter living in Paris, had gained a 
considerable amount of strength in the French legislature by the end of 1796. Vaublanc 
painted the revolution in Saint-Domingue as having “arrived at the most extreme degree 
of misery.”195 He succeeded for some time in convincing the Legislative Corps that the 
formerly enslaved could not distinguish between liberty and “unrestrained license.”196  
Vaublanc adamantly opposed admitting the deputies from the north to their 
respective positions in the Legislative Corps, arguing that these elections had not been 
conducted in accordance with the electoral procedures of the Constitution of Year III. 
Instead, he claimed, they had been rigged by Laveaux, Sonthonax, and L’Ouverture.197 
As Bernard Gainot says, “The Clichyens thus argued that the elections that took place in 
North of Saint-Domingue [had been] the pure product of military despotism.”198 
Vaublanc was intent upon discrediting the civil commission for favoring the black 
officers in the north at the expense of the gens de couleur in the south. He sought to 
illustrate that Sonthonax’s emancipation decree had been an enormous failure, leading to 
                                                
194 See Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 213.  
195 L’Ouverture, “A Refutation of Some Assertaions in a Speech Pronounced in the 
Corps Législatif…by Viénot Vaublanc,” in Slave Revolution in the Caribbean: A Brief 
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198 Bernard Gainot, “La Deputation de Saint-Domingue au corps legislative du 
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and justifying unprecedented violence against whites in Saint-Domingue. This violence, 
he argued, kept the colony from achieving its previous profitability, and thus, 
emancipation was doing more harm than good for the Republic.199 Upon offering this 
account of the events in Saint-Domingue, Vaublanc was thus able to convince the 
Legislative Corps for a time that the elections in Saint-Domingue were unconstitutional.  
Despite this, L’Ouverture, along with Julian Raimond and Laveaux, succeeded in 
discrediting Vaublanc’s depiction of Saint-Domingue, arguing that the violence there 
was no worse than in France. Further, in addition to rewarding the ex-slaves’ loyalty to 
the Republic, they argued that reversing the emancipation decree would have far worse 
consequences for the planters than allowing freedom to reign in Saint-Domingue.200 As a 
result, the tides turned in Paris, and the decision to annul the 1796 election in Le Cap 
was overturned. Laveaux and several other African descended representatives who had 
been elected in Saint-Domingue were reinstated to their posts as deputies and initiated a 
campaign to preserve emancipation in the colonies, which enabled them to fight for the 
preservation of emancipation in the Legislative Corps.201  
While Laveaux and his fellow representatives had great success in the Council of 
Five Hundred, the 1797 debates were nevertheless emblematic of a longstanding anxiety 
that Saint-Domingue seems to have prompted concerning the ideal of universal 
emancipation. The planters, whose economic well being depended on disavowing the 
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benefits of freedom, undoubtedly fueled this anxiety in Paris in 1797. Yet, as Malick 
Ghachem explains, the events in Saint-Domingue had informed the political climate of 
Paris as early as 1793. Ghachem argues that a strategic analogy had been drawn early on 
between the Vendée and the violence in Saint-Domingue. In an effort to play on the 
fears that the Vendée had brought about in metropolitan France, the planters developed a 
vocabulary that identified the slave revolts with the French peasant revolts. This, in turn, 
operated to convince the ruling elite that the liberation of the lower echelons of society 
would harm the Republic.202 According to Ghachem, this analogy had a powerful effect 
on the direction of political life in France. In the early years of the Saint-Domingue 
Revolution, it was purported by the planters that Sonthonax and Polverel were acting as 
tyrants and using the slaves’ unenlightened propensity towards violence to gain control 
of the colony. By 1797, this rhetoric had become so entrenched and the religious 
dimension of the Vendée was so closely associated with Saint-Domingue, that some 
came to believe “evildoing” forces were not only controlling the black masses across the 
Atlantic but were also responsible for violence from below in metropolitan France.203 
Therefore, in propagating this analogy, the planters were able to  cultivate a kind of 
political rhetoric that suggested the African slave could not be brought within the fold of 
the revolutionary ideals of the Republic.  
CONCLUSION: INTERPRETING THE 1796 ELECTION  
 While the official transcript suggests that the election unfolded in a fairly 
straightforward manner, the debates of 1797 help to illustrate why the interpretations of 
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the election are so varied. Based on these debates, it seems there was a great deal at stake 
in these elections. According to Stein, two interpretations are often given of the election, 
one that accuses L’Ouverture of ensuring Sonthonax’s election and the other accusing 
Sonthonax himself of rigging the election.204 Madiou offers an especially theatrical 
account of the electoral assembly in Le Cap, portraying Sonthonax as a tyrant who 
encouraged his supporters to hold the electors hostage as they voted. Madiou says that 
many who had been elected to serve in the assembly in Le Cap were opposed to 
Sonthonax. However, on the day voting took place, Gignoux, one of Sonthonax’s 
supporters who had been wandering the streets armed with a sword, entered the 
assembly and threatened to cut down anyone who opposed Sonthonax’s appointment.205 
Soon after, Madiou says, General Pierre Michel entered the assembly with an entourage 
of soldiers: 
[Michel Pierre] had one hand on a loaded pistol and the other on a sword. He sat 
down on the desk and declared with fury that he would bring all to fire and blood 
if Sonthonax and these candidates were not appointed. The terrified electors 
hastened to proceed to the election. The names of Sonthonax, Mentor, Annecy, 
Thomany and Laveaux were brought out of the ballot box. They were proclaimed 
deputies of St. Domingue.206    
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Madiou says that soon after, Sonthonax’s followers roamed the city chanting insults at 
those sympathetic with the South. Sonthonax’s letter was then read to the assembly, 
thanking them for his election, and soon after, it was announced throughout the North 
that Sonthonax, along with the other representatives had been named as a deputy.207  
This account, colorful as it is, lacks evidential support. Given that Sonthonax did 
not immediately return to Paris, it is not clear why Sonthonax would have gone to such 
great lengths to have himself elected.208 Madiou’s depiction seems far more consistent 
with his mistrust for Sonthonax and the Republic than the record provided by the 
assembly transcript itself. Nevertheless, Madiou’s account is intriguing and reveals 
something significant about the tumultuous conditions under which this election took 
place, as well as the effort that was made to write this out of the official record.  It is 
perhaps especially beneficial because it, unlike most accounts of the revolution, suggests 
that it was not the “barbaric” masses that caused the democratic process in Saint-
Domingue to fail, but rather the French and especially Sonthonax.  
Though both James and Stein, along with more recent scholars like Dubois offer 
far more tempered accounts of the election, all three depict it as providing a strategic 
opportunity for L’Ouverture to seize control of the island and for Sonthonax to return to 
France as a deputy to ensure abolition remained in force in the colony. James says that 
L’Ouverture wanted Laveaux to be elected to serve as a deputy in the Directory to secure 
his position as commander-in-chief of the colony.209 James suggests too that Sonthonax 
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would ultimately have himself elected because he worried that the tides were changing 
with respect to the question of emancipation in Paris by 1796. The radical politics of the 
people that had been pervasive throughout metropolitan France no longer held sway. 
Though the bourgeoisie remained enemies of the monarch, they wanted to keep the 
masses in their place.210 James remarks on the birth of the Directory and the restricted 
franchise this gave way to so as to illustrate that those who were now in power were 
more concerned with preserving order than preserving emancipation.211 Consequently, 
James says,  
Sonthonax reached San Domingo in May 1796, but by the time preparations were 
being made for the San Domingo elections in August, the colonial reaction was 
making such headway in France that he felt, both in his own defense and for the 
sake of the blacks that it would be better if he went back to France.212 
While emancipation was achieved in 1793 and 1794, the legislative debates of 
1797 reflect a broader sentiment in the metropole regarding the possibility of fully 
enfranchising those who had previously been excluded from French political life.  
As I have tried to show, I take the movement from 1793 to 1796 to constitute a shift 
whereby the promise of political inclusion was transformed into a specter of exclusion. 
This specter of exclusion was made manifest in the 1796 election, which showed that 
becoming citizen was neither sufficient for guaranteeing political inclusion nor capable 
of opening up a space of freedom, though it was certainly necessary for both. A dilemma 
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thus emerges from these elections regarding the stakes involved in becoming 
enfranchised. Is it possible to take up the task of politics in a community from which one 
was once excluded if a threat of betrayal remains present? If so, is the harm this inflicts 
too high a price to pay to become enfranchised? This dilemma both continues playing 
out and remains unresolved by the end of the Haitian Revolution.  
 L’Ouverture’s faith in the French Republic was ultimately turned against him 
during the Leclerc expedition in 1802. This monumental betrayal gave way to 
Dessalines’ cry for independence on the grounds that being French and being free were 
mutually exclusive ends. Yet, as Mimi Sheller explains, the leaders of Haiti struggled 
throughout the nineteenth century to build a new nation from the ashes of French Saint-
Domingue that was both founded on the principles of liberty and equality and devoid of 
all traces of the colonizer. She develops this in terms of the citizen soldier, and says, “A 
fundamental aspect of the Haitian nation-building project was the elevation of the black 
man out of the depths of slavery into his rightful place as father, leader, and protector of 
his own people.”213 Given the protective position that Haiti had to assume in the wake of 
revolution, Sheller explains that this image of the patriarch and the soldier became a 
symbol of freedom. Yet, from this, a duality emerged whereby the very militarism that 
had been emancipatory became self-destructive. This, she argues, led to a patriarchal, 
hierarchical, and elitist structure of citizenship and civic duty that ultimately reinstated 
the structures that revolution sought to undo. Becoming Haitian thus gave way to a 
paradox whereby “the egalitarian and democratic values of republicanism were 
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constantly undercut by the hierarchical and elitist values of miltarism.”214 By the early 
twentieth century, figures like Jean Price-Mars began working out what it would mean to 
open up possibilities from out of the paradox that the colonial and post-colonial situation 
presents. As I will discuss in the following chapter, the reflections that this leads to not 
only reveal the significance of the Haitian Revolution for understanding the age of 
revolution as a whole, but also complicates and enlarges questions in contemporary 
political philosophy regarding citizenship, the politics  of exclusion, and the meaning of 
universal rights.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION: ARENDT, PRICE-MARS, AND GLISSANT ON  
 
ENFRANCHISEMENT AND EXCLUSION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As I have tried to demonstrate in previous chapters, the elections of 1793 and 
1796 in Saint-Domingue had an unprecedented, albeit often overlooked, significance 
during the revolutionary period. The first of these elections represented an initial step in 
a process by which the colonized took up and expanded the ideals of the French 
Revolution beyond what had been imagined by those in the metropole. Indeed, we find 
in the wake of this election that the revolutionary ideal of universal emancipation 
became embodied by the enslaved who, after freeing themselves, were extended the 
rights of French citizenship and granted access to the political community that had 
previously relegated them to the status of livestock. Undoubtedly a triumphant moment, 
it was nevertheless followed by the conservative Constitution of 1795. While many 
scholars have attributed this constitutional shift to the threat from below on the 
continent, the National Convention also faced a another threat from below in the 
colonies. Thus, having just granted political rights to the formerly enslaved in 1794, the 
Convention swiftly restricted the franchise in 1795, keeping those who had become 
citizens in Saint-Domingue from activating their newly acquired political status through 
the vote in 1796.  
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In this chapter, I will explore the implications of this tragic turn for broader 
questions in social and political theory, particularly with regard to the question of 
political exclusion. This question has both occupied European political theorists since 
the beginning of the twentieth century and remained prescient for more recent problems 
regarding the meaning of citizenship, the possibility of political community, and the 
limits of human rights in a modern and globalized world. Yet, examining the meaning of 
this turn, along with the underlying significance of the Haitian Revolution as a whole, 
cannot be done by merely distilling a theory from the events that unfolded in Saint-
Domingue between 1793 and 1796. Rather, given that the Haitian Revolution has been 
written out of the history that these political philosophers have relied on to develop 
theoretical approaches to modern political life, it is necessary to start from this omission.  
Hence, I will begin this discussion by turning to Kant, Hegel, and Marx to show 
why the French Revolution made the idea of revolution philosophically interesting in the 
nineteenth century. In failing to fulfill the rational principles set forth by Enlightenment 
thinkers, the French Revolution opened up a set of new problems that came to be 
understood by European philosophers as distinctive of political life in the modern era. 
These problems resituated the lines of the debate regarding the political sphere and came 
to shape the critiques of modernity that emerged in the twentieth century in response to 
the unprecedented destruction of the first and second world wars, the rapid ascendance 
of totalitarianism, and the horrors of the concentration camps. Consequently, those in the 
twentieth century attempting to come to terms with these events took their point of 
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departure for diagnosing the problems of modern political life almost exclusively from 
the French Revolution.   
As I will argue, however, the birth of modern politics and the problems contained 
therein cannot be understood without also turning to the Haitian Revolution. After 
considering the problems that the French Revolution posed for European philosophers, I 
will consider how German Jewish thinker, Hannah Arendt, attempts to rethink the 
political in the wake of the Holocaust by drawing attention to the problem of 
statelessness and the importance of the political for engendering freedom. While Arendt 
seems right to return to the political and rethink the meaning of freedom within the 
public sphere, her suggestion that citizenship alone is enough to remedy the problem of 
statelessness fails to consider the relationship between political inclusion and the 
violence of assimilation. I thus want to expose this lacuna in Arendt’s analysis by 
developing it in relation to the Haitian Revolution, which reveals a tension constituted 
by the impossible choice between assimilation and revolution that is epitomized in the 
relationship between L’Ouverture and Dessalines. As this tension is broadly 
representative of the specter of exclusion that persists for those who become 
enfranchised after having been cast out, considering Arendt in the context of the Haitian 
Revolution will be helpful for complicating and deepening her conception of citizenship.  
To do this, I will consider how the Haitian Revolution has been taken up by 
thinkers in the African Diaspora for the sake of generating a kind of political theory that 
engages directly with the history of colonization and slavery that paved the way for the 
modern world. In particular, I will focus on the work of Jean Price-Mars whose re-
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appropriation of the history of Saint-Domingue laid the groundwork for the Negritude 
movement, pan-Africanism, and anti-colonialism. Price-Mars’ work focuses on 
reinterpreting Haitian Voodoo and Creole through Haiti’s revolutionary past. In so 
doing, he suggests that Haitian culture is neither European nor African, but rather a 
unique culture of resistance that refuses to be assimilated either way.  I will then 
consider the work of Edouard Glissant, whose poetics of relation and conception of 
“Creolization” suggest a way of affirming the tension this creates by living within it, 
rather than trying to overcome it by turning to another community for the sake of 
adopting a less dislocated sense of self.  
Taken together with Price-Mars and Glissant, I will argue that Arendt’s 
conception of citizenship is too narrow to distinguish sufficiently between political 
inclusion and the violence of assimilation. Moreover, in taking her point of departure 
from the French Revolution alone, she is unable to see that it is constitutive of modern 
political life that becoming enfranchised is accompanied by this violence. By contrast, 
Price-Mars and Glissant, in turning to the Haitian Revolution, are able to not only 
illustrate the significance of the event itself, but also the way in which the problems it 
poses remain present for those who were once cast out. By rethinking Arendt and figures 
like her  from out of the Haitian Revolution, it is possible to expand their analyses so 
that they can more adequately address what it means for those who were once excluded 
to become enfranchised. 
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KANT, HEGEL, AND MARX: PHILOSOPHY AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
 In calling forth the ideals of the Enlightenment for the sake of political uprising, 
the French Revolution had a confounding effect on philosophers. On the one hand, it 
revealed the possibility of reinventing political life on the basis of rational principles. On 
the other hand, it suggested to its onlookers that in the context of the political, the 
rational state could only be born out of irrational revolution. This question of the conflict 
between the rational state and the revolutionary means required for its formation came to 
occupy a central position in the political philosophy of Kant as well as Hegel. This, in 
turn, produced an anxiety over revolution and the problems it posed for modern political 
life that persisted through the work of those who followed them from Marx to Foucault. 
In one way or another, Kant, Hegel and Marx are all dealing with the problem that “the 
people” posed for establishing an enlightened political sphere within the context of the 
European continent. Hence, those who take up this tradition in the twentieth century 
remain oriented by the continental experience in their attempts to address the problems 
posed by the notion of universal emancipation.  
For Kant, the French Revolution was an event in which reason threatened to lose 
itself in an abyss, which he believed first became apparent in 1792 during the trial and 
beheading of King Louis XVI.215 Kant locates the true Terror in this moment, suggesting 
that it made visible something impossible. As Rebecca Comay explains, for Kant, the 
trial revealed “an illegality…both internal to the law and key to its foundational 
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authority.”216 As Kant watched this event unfold, he discovered that the very idea of the 
French Revolution contradicted itself insofar as it undid the notion of right that provided 
its ultimate ground. The people, upon murdering the head of state in the name of justice, 
broke both the moral and public law, placing it at odds with “the transcendental formula 
for public right.”217 In effect, then, the French revolutionaries, in using this act as a 
symbol to inaugurate their effort to bring about a new political order founded on law and 
right, had committed the ultimate crime. That is, in killing the king, Kant believed that 
the people of France had plunged themselves back into a state of nature, calling into 
question the possibility of a body politic founded on the moral law, the very law that 
provided the condition for the possibility of freedom and the fulfillment of the supreme 
human vocation. Therefore, the French Revolution created a rupture for Kant, whereby 
humanity’s progressive march towards the realization of its freedom appeared to be 
stalled.218 As Ferenc Fehér argues, Kant’s attempt in his later works to come to terms 
with the problems that the French Revolution posed for the primacy of practical reason 
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marked the birth of modern political thought.219 While Kant condemned the beheading 
of Louis XVI as something worse than radical evil, he nevertheless continued to praise 
the principles underlying the Revolution.220 Thus, in reinventing the idea of revolution in 
the context of the political as an undoing of the past, the French Revolution both 
troubled and mystified thinkers of universal freedom.  
Hegel’s confrontation with the violence of the Terror, along with his abiding 
interest in Kant’s critical project set the stage for his broader attempt to account for the 
unfulfilled prophecy of the French Revolution.221 Hegel, unlike his contemporaries, 
neither wanted to claim that the Revolution was an unprecedented event, nor absorb it 
entirely within a broader, structural interpretation of history.222 Instead, as Steven B. 
Smith says, “Hegel wanted to celebrate the Revolution but only after it had been firmly 
located within his own philosophy of history…Henceforth, the French Revolution like 
other great turning points of modern European history…could be regarded not as 
isolated or discrete happenings but as part of a worldwide struggle aimed at the 
realization of freedom.”223 Hegel conceived of human history as a dialectical process 
whereby humanity slowly and painfully comes to consciousness of its freedom. He thus 
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understood the French Revolution as a monumental moment in the unfolding of 
European modernity, as well as an astonishing tragedy.224 In the spirit of idealism, Hegel 
located both its momentousness and its tragic character in the Enlightenment itself, 
which rightly called for freedom but did so by promulgating a notion of human rights 
predicated on the rational desires of private individuals. On Hegel’s account, this idea of 
natural rights, in presupposing a given, self-contained subject, failed to recognize that 
the human being is “a being in the making,” constituted by the communal relations in 
which she finds herself.225 Moreover, for Hegel, it overlooked the fact that the idea of 
“rights” is not static, but rather bound up with the dynamic unfolding of history.226  
Given how deeply wedded eighteenth century philosophers had been to the idea 
of natural rights for legitimizing the state, Hegel’s analysis of the French Revolution 
gave way to a radical intervention in European political thought. He suggested, in 
contrast to those before him, that freedom was not bound up with natural rights, but 
instead could only be realized within the context of communities.227 Moreover, unlike 
Kant, Hegel took the French Revolution to reveal the destructive emptiness of the 
Enlightenment in its adherence to abstract ideals and autonomous agents entirely 
divorced from the particularity of people in their communal context. The Terror, for 
Hegel, was a symptom of this emptiness, a function of the principle of utility, whereby 
reason, in longing for significance, sought to consume or overcome the world. Comay 
says, “Having defined itself as negative, reason [was] set to embark on an annihilating 
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mission that [would] culminate in a ‘fury of destruction.’”228 The French Revolution 
indicated to Hegel that “modernity takes ruination…as its foundation.”229 That is, for 
Hegel, modernity was born out of the tragedy of the political order, and the Terror 
served as a “permanent reminder of what remains unburied and unmourned in every 
struggle for legitimacy.”230 Hegel therefore shifted the lines of the debate regarding 
modern politics, leaving behind the question of natural rights for a discourse concerning 
the alienation and violence produced by the tragic contradictions bound up with the 
politics of modernity. 
Marx appropriates Hegel’s dialectical conception of history, though he, of 
course, inverts Hegel’s idealism and rethinks history in terms of materialism. That is, 
whereas Hegel took ideas to shape human history and social conditions, Marx claimed 
that material conditions give rise to civil society and the “theoretical productions and 
forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics etc. etc.” contained therein.231 Yet, 
in rejecting Hegel’s idealism, François Furet explains that Marx nevertheless remained 
tethered to the French Revolution and, in particular, the gulf that Hegel identifies 
between the public and private sphere.232 According to Furet, modernity, for Marx, was 
most fundamentally constituted by market society, of which the French Revolution was 
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an inevitable product.233 As Furet says, “The bourgeoisie, which had already mastered 
society, crowned its domination by seizing political power.”234 The state had established 
what appeared to be an independent public realm predicated on an abstract notion of 
equality. Yet, for Marx, this public realm, in remaining separate from the private, 
material conditions of individuals, merely created a façade for a society in which the 
proletariat remained dependent on the bourgeoisie for its subsistence and the bourgeoisie 
on the proletariat for the exploitation of its labor.  
For Marx, the French Revolution revealed that the modern state, in being driven 
by capital, was inherently violent. That is, the law, which had supposedly been handed 
down by reason, was in fact an instrument of oppression that enable the bourgeoisie to 
sustain its domination and perpetuate the alienation of the proletariat. Marx suggests as 
much in The German Ideology when he says:  
Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their 
common interests…it follows that in the formation of all communal institutions 
the State acts as intermediary, that these institutions receive a political form. 
Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced 
from real basis – on free will. Similarly, the theory of law is in its turn reduced to 
the actual laws. Civil law develops simultaneously with private property out of 
the disintegration of the natural community.235  
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In this, Marx echoes Hegel, but goes further by suggesting that in the modern political 
realm, the law itself is inherently violent to the extent that it is not only predicated on a 
notion of the individual, but is also an instrument that the ruling class uses to maintain 
their domination. Therefore, Marx argues that the modern state does not produce 
autonomous individuals, but is instead rooted above all else in the alienation of the 
proletariat.  
    The French Revolution thus reoriented the meaning of modern political life for 
these European philosophers. No longer did the question of the political center on 
providing rational justification for the legitimacy of the state through a social contract. 
Rather, the formation of the modern state seemed instead to be predicated on an act of 
exclusion. Kant’s initial recognition of the philosophical problems of the French 
Revolution and Hegel’s dramatic development of these problems ultimately culminated 
with Marx in a new discourse concerned with critiquing the modern state and its 
alienating effect. Therefore, by the end of the nineteenth century, the possibility of 
founding a state on the basis of the rights of individuals or the “general will” had lost 
ground among many European thinkers. 
 Marx’s class based analysis of the French Revolution has undoubtedly fallen out 
of favor with historians.236 Yet, the idea of alienation and the notion that the law is 
inherently violent remained central for twentieth century European political theorists. 
The French Revolution, in outlining the limitations of an enlightened political order, 
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gave rise to an anxiety about revolution that took shape for philosophers in the twentieth 
century around questions of the legitimacy of violence, the inauthenticity of the crowd, 
and the problem of political exclusion. These themes are taken up and developed in the 
context of the events of the twentieth century by figures like Walter Benjamin, Theodor 
Adorno, Max Horkhiemer, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida and 
Michel Foucault. For these thinkers, modern politics and the problems contained therein 
have their origin in the French Revolution.  
In what follows, I will turn to the work of Arendt, to show how the problem of 
political exclusion, in particular, is taken up in the twentieth century. In so doing, I wish 
to show first that in taking her point of departure from the French Revolution, her 
critique of modern politics remains too narrow to capture the problem of statelessness 
that she rightly associates with the atrocities of the twentieth century. I then want to 
argue that the Haitian Revolution, in being bound up with the birth of modern politics, 
provides an integral way into this problem that can both complicate and more fully 
develop the way she conceives of citizenship.  
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE PROBLEM OF ENFRANCHISMENT 
Through her analysis of statelessness, Arendt offers a rich and prescient critique 
of modern politics that demands we rethink the meaning of political life in an age 
scarred by totalitarianism. On Arendt’s account, the condition of statelessness, in being 
constituted by “the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant 
and actions effective,” intr
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twentieth century.237 Consequently, in the wake of the Holocaust, she suggests that it is 
necessary to twist free from the Enlightenment ideal of liberty, which had proven far too 
abstract to protect humanity from itself, and turn instead to a notion freedom rooted in 
political community. In this, she both draws on and critically appropriates the insights 
that Kant, Hegel and Marx generated in response to the French Revolution. She thus 
maintains that citizenship is a lived and embodied phenomenon, meaning our 
understanding of freedom in the modern age must be rethought as distinctly political and 
attached to a place in which one’s rights are guaranteed.  
Arendt rightly identifies the problem of statelessness and makes a compelling 
case for why freedom must be re-inscribed within the political sphere. Yet, taking her 
remarks on statelessness and citizenship together with her conception of freedom and 
courage in the political sphere, it seems that the notion of citizenship she arrives at is 
inadequate for dealing with what it means to become enfranchised, particularly in a 
community from which one had previously been excluded. In Between Past and Future, 
Arendt argues that by the modern era, freedom had become disconnected from our 
experience in the world. In taking up the question of freedom in terms of the will, 
modern figures like Kant presuppose a contradiction between the inner self, which tells 
us we are free and responsible, and our experience in the world as it is constituted by 
causal and unwilled relations.238 Freedom thus became a metaphysical problem in the 
modern period, rather than a fact of everyday life, and, in being constituted as an “inner” 
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phenomenon, is severed from the political realm. This, she suggests, is dangerous 
because when freedom is equated with the will, and the will is positioned against 
inclination and worldly desire, she says the I-will paralyzes the I-can. The impotence of 
the will thus makes it the case that the will-to-power does not issue in freedom, but 
rather in the will-to-oppression.  
On Arendt’s account, freedom has come to be understood in the context of 
politics precisely this way; namely, as self-evident, inalienable, and only ascertainable 
through a retreat to the private sphere.239 She argues that the danger involved in 
understanding freedom like this was no more apparent than when the Rights of Man 
failed to protect stateless individuals from the concentration camps. Such rights, she 
argues, cannot simply be asserted in the abstract. Rather, they can only be guaranteed 
within political community. 
For this reason, she believes it is of utmost importance to separate freedom from 
the will and reattach it to the world of experience through politics. For Arendt, freedom 
arises not in the private realm, as is suggested by the tenets of modern liberalism, but 
rather through experience and association with others. Hence, political membership or 
citizenship is integral for Arendt, though she takes its significance to be overshadowed 
by modern liberalism.240 As she suggests in the Origins of Totalitarianism, citizenship 
grants individuals access to a space in which their right to speak and act is protected, and 
suggests that it is impossible to enact one’s freedom without first being recognized 
within a political community. She explains that the calamity of statelessness that had 
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befallen so many by the middle of the twentieth century was due “not [to] the loss of 
specific rights…but rather the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any 
specific rights.”241 For Arendt, it is only in virtue of the loss of political membership that 
one can lose their humanity. Citizenship is therefore the condition for the possibility of 
freedom to the extent that it guarantees one’s place within political life. 
Arendt’s discussion effectively demonstrates the danger involved in conceiving 
of freedom outside the realm of politics. Yet, the way in which she suggests freedom is 
enacted once one has become a citizen reveals a problem for those who enter into 
political life after having been denied the rights of citizenship in the very same 
community. Arendt argues that freedom is only possible through what she calls “political 
action.” For her, action and action alone, initiates something anew. Thus, freedom 
always presupposes the human capacity to act.242 Moreover, she says, “The reason for 
the existence of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action.”243 Such action 
requires community, and in particular, political community.244 In other words, freedom 
for Arendt consists not in the preservation of oneself in the private or social sphere. 
Though both are necessary for freedom, freedom itself only appears when one carries 
out the task of politics for the sake of the community to which one belongs. 
For this reason, Arendt maintains that courage is the chief political virtue.245 
Courage in political life is vital to the extent that the public realm constitutes a world 
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that existed before us and is meant to outlast us. Insofar as the enactment of freedom is 
predicated on leaving the protective security of the private realm for the sake of 
preserving this world, courage is necessary for political life. That is, Arendt says, 
“Courage liberates men from their worry about life for the freedom of the world. 
Courage is indispensable because in politics not life but the world is at stake.”246 To 
have courage, for Arendt, means to act beyond oneself for the sake of the community 
and the institutions, traditions and values that sustain it. She locates the failure of the 
French Revolution, from which she takes her point of departure for critiquing modern 
political life, precisely in this; in being driven by the hungry masses, it became a 
movement governed by necessity rather than freedom.247 She says:  
It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance 
of the French Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its 
doom, and the result was…that the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be 
surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself.248 
In light of this, Arendt argues that acting beyond oneself is a requirement of freedom 
insofar our own lives, in being bound up with satisfaction of our individual desires, 
remain ruled by necessity. Freedom thus depends on a public space wherein individuals 
come together for the sake of creating and sustaining something bigger than themselves; 
namely, a world in which freedom can appear. Citizenship gains its fullest meaning 
when freedom is enacted through political action that has as its aim the preservation of 
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the political community rather than the desires of the individual. Therefore, Arendt’s 
conception of courage together with her discussion of citizenship implies that the ideal 
citizen is one who has the courage to exceed herself in taking up this project.   
While Arendt’s diagnosis of the problem of statelessness seems right, her 
discussion of citizenship and freedom presents a problem for those who become 
enfranchised after having been excluded. Insofar as Arendt’s notion of political action 
consists in preserving a space in which freedom can appear, freedom requires that 
individuals act for the sake of carrying the community to which they belong from the 
past into the future.249 This, it seems, complicates political life for those who acquire 
citizenship after having been excluded, as it renders their legitimacy within the political 
sphere contingent upon recognizing and being recognized within a set of institutions, 
traditions, and values that were never meant for them. 
It is possible to bring this problem into focus by extending Arendt’s analysis 
beyond the French Revolution to the events that unfolded in Saint-Domingue. The 
Haitian Revolution, though overlooked by Arendt, seemed to be driven first and 
foremost by a conception of freedom rooted in the political. While it was guided in part 
by securing the private rights of individuals, L’Ouverture and the revolutionary masses 
sought to bring the ideals of the French Revolution to bear on the political sphere in 
Saint-Domingue. Insofar as those ideals were formulated in the same political 
community that housed their colonial masters, the Haitian Revolution was emblematic of 
the way Arendt believes revolutions ought to go. Rather than merely throwing off the 
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yoke of the oppressor, L’Ouverture called on the inhabitants of Saint-Domingue to act 
for the sake of something bigger than themselves. That is, he called on the formerly 
enslaved to carry out the project of freedom that the French Revolution had begun.250  
Beyond this, the election of 1793 and the subsequent enfranchisement of the 
formerly enslaved in 1794, seem to achieve precisely what Arendt believes politics in 
the modern era should do; namely, reach out to those who have been excluded. Yet, as 
the election of 1796 demonstrated, becoming enfranchised was not enough to guarantee 
the rights that Arendt takes to be constitutive of political freedom. This historical 
moment illustrates that for those who become enfranchised, the specter of exclusion 
remains present.  
On Arendt’s account, political action – the very condition for the possibility of 
freedom – requires pushing one’s own heritage and history to the side for the sake of a 
common world. In the case of the formerly enslaved in Saint-Domingue, the common 
world that they entered into in 1794 was founded upon the very institutions, traditions, 
and structures that had once legitimated their exclusion. Hence, if we take seriously the 
Haitian Revolution for understanding the dilemmas of modern political life, it seems that 
the stakes involved in becoming enfranchised and entering into political life from out of 
a condition of state-sanctioned exclusion are far greater than Arendt suggests. While 
L’Ouverture was willing to enter into French political life, Dessalines’s impassioned 
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remarks in the 1804 Haitain Declaration of Independence indicate that the stakes were 
simply too high for the formerly enslaved to become French citizens.  
PRICE-MARS AND GLISSANT: RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY THROUGH THE 
HAITIAN REVOLUTION  
The tragic turn that I suggest is revealed through the elections of 1793 and 1796 
is emblematic of a broader concern regarding what it means to move forward in modern 
political life in light of the historical memory of slavery and colonization. While figures 
like Arendt overlook the significance of the Haitian Revolution, it nevertheless inspired 
a vast network of intellectual traditions throughout the African Diaspora that engaged 
directly with the question of political exclusion. As Kersuze Simeon-Jones argues, the 
1791 ceremony of Bois Caïman laid the foundation for a tradition of black nationalism 
that permeated black thought in the western hemisphere throughout nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Likewise, the emancipation decree of 1794  gave way to the 
formation of a notion of black consciousness, that provided a platform for the colonized 
to reinvent the history that had been written of them by their colonizers.251 L’Ouverture 
came to be understood as the founding father of this tradition of black political thought, 
which inspired a number of rebellions and revolutions throughout the nineteenth 
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century.252 He also provided inspiration for figures like David Walker, Martin Delany, 
Sojourner Truth, Fredrick Douglass and others to establish a political agenda oriented by 
the conception of a unified African Diaspora working to emancipate the enslaved 
throughout the nineteenth century.253 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea 
of black nationalism and black unity had been transformed into a complex network of 
traditions led at first by figures like W.E.B dubois, Marcus Garvey, Zora Neal Hurston, 
and then by thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Aimé Cesaire, Léon Damas, and Malcolm X. 
And while L’Ouverture and the Haitian Revolution stand at the beginning of this 
heritage of political thought, black nationalism’s original manifestation broke into an 
array of diverse political programs including Indigenismo, Pan-Africanism, Garveyism, 
the New Negro Renaissance, Négritude, Anti-colonialism, and Africollo.254   
Jean Price-Mars argues that the importance of the Haitian Revolution consisted 
in the complex and unique culture of resistance that motivated it. Through his analysis of 
Haitian Voodoo and Creole, Price-Mars provided an integral pivot point at the beginning 
of the twentieth century for furnishing a conception of black consciousness. Though he 
was a Haitian “man of letters,” he was deeply critical of the black elite in Haiti for its 
insistence upon “[donning] the old frock of western civilization” in the wake of the 
Haitian Revolution.255 Rather than taking Haitian independence as an opportunity to 
nurture and cultivate the unique culture that the Haitian people had created through their 
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own revolutionary efforts, he argues that the elite re-imposed a hierarchal system that 
mimicked the French, praising all things European while degrading and suppressing any 
trace of an African past.  
In his renowned 1920 text Ainsi parla l’oncle (So Spoke the Uncle), Price-Mars 
explains that the enslaved engaged in a monumental undertaking during the Haitian 
Revolution, reclaiming their freedom against all odds. Yet, upon recognizing the 
enormity of the task involved in establishing national cohesion in the face of a radically 
new situation in 1804, he argues that the revolutionaries “inserted the new grouping into 
a dislocated framework of dispersed white society.”256 The Haitian people were trapped 
between an African ancestry that lacked a single origin and a system of French colonial 
values that were inherently alienating, and, as such, incapable of being copied by the 
former colonial subjects. Consequently, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Price-
Mars says that the Haitian elite had become infected with what he calls a “collective 
bovaryism” or, “The faculty of a society of seeing itself as other than it is…by an 
implacable logic, we gradually forced ourselves to believe we were ‘colored’ 
Frenchmen, we forgot we were simply Haitians.”257 In light of this critique, Price-Mars 
set out in his work to accomplish two goals. First, he was especially interested in 
challenging both black elites and white scientists who endorsed and sought to legitimate 
the belief that those of African descent were culturally and biologically inferior to those 
of European descent. Second, he wanted to vindicate not just African traditions, but also 
the unique way in which these traditions had been appropriated by the Haitian masses 
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through their resistance to the colonial situation.258 In so doing, he argues that this 
unique appropriation on the part of the enslaved masses provided the foundation for their 
revolutionary movements in 1791.  
Price-Mars reappropriates Haiti’s revolutionary past through an analysis of 
Voodoo by first demonstrating its validity as a religion in response to those who take 
Voodoo to be a kind of primitive magic, lacking in any kind of moral framework.259 He 
says that if Voodoo is judged according to the moral principles of Christianity, it does 
indeed appear to lack a framework for ethics. Yet, upon overcoming this prejudice, one 
finds that Voodoo contains within it a rich ethical code that both demands private 
discipline and punishes transgressions against the community.260 Price-Mars develops 
his account of the African origins of Voodoo by tracing it to the regions associated with 
the African languages that were most predominantly spoken by slaves in Haiti. In so 
doing, however, he does not want to reduce Haitian religion to African religion. Rather, 
he explains that while Voodoo clearly derives from a number of different religious 
practices in Africa, Voodoo itself cannot be found anywhere on the continent. This, he 
says, is because:  
                                                
258 See Pedro Luis San Miguel, The Imagined Island: History, Identity and Utopia in 
Hispaniola (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 70.  
259 Specifically, he maintains that like all other religions, Voodoo presupposes the 
existence of spiritual beings, depends on a hierarchical priestly body, and has a theology 
or system of representation rooted in the inherited African practice of accounting for 
natural phenomena, “which lies dormant at the base of the anarchical beliefs upon which 
the hybrid Catholicism of our popular masses rests.” See Price-Mars, So Spoke the 
Uncle, 39.  
260 Price-Mars, So Spoke the Uncle, 41.  
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Negroes – whatever their beliefs, or aptitudes, - were forced to receive 
instruction in order to be baptized in the Catholic religion within the week after 
their debarkation at San Domingue. We are even able to affirm that one of the 
first surprises which greeted the African on the threshold of entering the New 
World was the demonstration of violence by which he was forced to 
acknowledge other Gods than he had known.261 
Prices-Mars suggests that Haitian Voodoo must be understood as a creation unique unto 
itself, predicated on the colonial situation out of which it was born. Both a response to 
the violent imposition of Christianity and an expression of the inability on the part of the 
colonizer to erase completely the memory of the enslaved, he argues that Voodoo is a 
religion of resistance. It is for this reason that the beginning of the Haitian Revolution is 
marked by the Voodoo ceremony at Bois Caïman. An explosion of “accumulation of 
such rancor and resentment,” Price-Mars claims that the sacramental words of the 
Voodoo Priest Boukman, which prompted the enslaved to action, make clear Voodoo’s 
uniqueness in being bound up with the desire for freedom.262  Price-Mars makes a 
                                                
261 Ibid, 47.  
262 Ibid, 47.  
The second half of what was supposedly said at the Bois Caïman Voodoo ceremony 
reads as follows: 
  The God of white men commands crime, 
 Ours solicits good deeds,  
 But this God who is so good (ours), 
 Will guide our hand.  
 And will give us assistance.  
 Break the image of the God of white men 
 Who has thirst for our tears 
 Hear in our hearts the call for liberty!  
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similar case for the birth of Haitian Creole, saying, “We will agree without any difficulty 
that our Creole is a collective creation arising from the need of masters and slaves to 
communicate their thoughts with one another. As a consequence, it bears the imprint of 
the vices and qualities of the human milieu and the circumstances which developed 
it.”263 Creole, he argues, is a compromise between Spanish, English and French and the 
idioms of Africa that the enslaved brought with them. As a result, spoken Creole has an 
“unsuspected depth,” riddled with ambiguity that gives the language great subtlety.264 
This subtlety, however, can only be expressed through inflections in the voice, and 
hence, Price-Mars suggests that it is thanks to the richness of spoken Creole that Haiti 
has maintained such a robust oral tradition. He draws attention to both the stories and the 
songs that are bound up with this oral tradition, so as to illustrate the way in which 
Creole, when spoken or sung, expresses a deeper, common history that is unique to the 
Haitian. Yet, it is a common history that is constituted by an irreducible tension that the 
Haitian people cannot help but express. In his discussion of song he says that the people 
of Haiti are: 
A people who sing and who suffer, who grieve and who laugh, who dance and 
are resigned. ‘From birth to death, song is associated with his whole life.’ He 
sings when he has joy in his heart or tears in his eyes. He sings in the furor of 
combat, under the hail of machine-gun fire, or in the fray of bayonets. He sings 
of the apotheosis of victories and the horror of defeats. He sings of the muscular 
                                                                                                                                           
For the full text in English and Creole, see Jean Price-Mars, So Spoke the Uncle, trans. 
Magdalene W. Shannon (Washington DC: Three Continents Press, 1983), 48. 
263 Ibid, 24. 
264 Ibid, 25. 
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effort and the rest after the task, of the ineradicable optimism and humble 
intuition that neither injustice nor suffering are eternal and that, moreover, 
nothing is hopeless since ‘bon Dieu bon’ [God is Good].265 
With this, Price-Mars seeks to invert the colonial values that the Haitian elite so readily 
endorsed. He appropriates both Voodoo and Creole so as to clarify to the world the 
uniqueness of the culture that had been created by the enslaved African in the Atlantic 
world. Yet, he wants to emphasize that this culture is neither African nor European, but 
rather unique to the colonized. His suggestion seems to be that by taking this kind of 
culture to something distinctive in itself, rather than a bastardized version of European 
culture, as the black bourgeoisie in Haiti were wont to assume, we find that it laid the 
groundwork for the unprecedented events that took place in Saint-Domingue. Price-Mars 
thus reinserts the forgotten masses into the story of the revolutionary period, not by 
merely suggesting that the enslaved took part in a European project, but rather, by means 
of a culture of resistance that they built through their own creative efforts. 
 The impact of Price-Mars’ work was two-fold. First, it transformed the idea of 
Haitian culture into a culture produced by the colonized subject, thereby endorsing a 
notion of black consciousness that could be upheld throughout the African Diaspora. 
That is, Simeon-Jones says, “If Ainsi parla l’oncle was a defense of Haitian culture, it 
was equally a defense of black identity as well as a valorization of black Africa and its 
heritage.”266 Price-Mars transforms and reinvents the idea of “blackness” in a way that 
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both acknowledged and remained critical of the oppressive racial hierarchy that had been 
used to sustain the colonial enterprise, while rendering impotent its dehumanizing effect 
by upholding blackness. In short, his work gave rise to the idea that it is necessary, 
especially for the black elite, to become conscious of being black. Second, in drawing on 
the Haitian Revolution, and suggesting that the culture of the colonized in Haiti is 
tethered to a notion of resistance and emancipation, Price-Mars makes the idea of race a 
political question rather than a scientific one.267 In so doing, his work paved the way for 
the Negritude movement, the New Negro Renaissance, and pan-Africanism, all of which 
yielded a rich body of political thought in the mid-twentieth century oriented by the 
notion of black consciousness that he cultivated through his re-appropriation of Haiti’s 
revolutionary past.  
By the 1930’s, the work of Price-Mars and others like him began moving beyond 
national borders as it became clear that Price-Mars analysis of the Haitian peasantry 
addressed the problems facing the formerly enslaved throughout the world.268 For this 
reason, figures of the Negritude movement like Aimé Césaire took up the idea of a 
revolutionary black consciousness, but unlike Price-Mars, explicitly keyed this 
discussion to the Diaspora as a whole. Simeon-Jones explains that the Negritude 
                                                
267 It is important to note that Price-Mars is doing this work at the same time that W.E.B. 
Dubois is finishing his research for the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory on black urban 
communities throughout the United States. The effect of Dubois’s work is similar to that 
of Price-Mars, in that it showed that poverty, lack of education, and poor health among 
black people in these areas are not a function of biology, but rather an effect of racial 
casting and social inequality. Further, like Price-Mars, Dubois tries to show the unique 
and remarkable culture that black urban communities had cultivated in spite of these 
conditions.  
268 See Simeon-Jones, Literary and Sociopolitical Writings, 129.  
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movement was guided by four principles. First, drawing from figures like Price-Mars, it 
called for the valorization of Africa and the African past that informed black culture 
throughout the Diaspora. Second, it offered a critique of the devaluation of this African 
heritage on the grounds that becoming alienated from it generated a sense inferiority that 
tended to destroy black communities. Third, it called for the affirmation of a black 
identity on the grounds that such affirmation could undo the centuries of racial 
oppression that African descended peoples had suffered. Fourth, it kept a critical 
distance from western education and neo-colonialism and called into question black 
intellectuals who ascribed to the principles contained therein.269  
Though the principles of Negritude get developed in a number of ways, Edouard 
Glissant’s work perhaps best exemplifies the tension that I argue is revealed through the 
Haitian Revolution and bound up with the birth of modern politics. Glissant, like his 
more famous contemporary, Frantz Fanon, is a descendent of the Negritude movement, 
though he believes it is necessary to challenge some of Negritude’s assumptions. Rather 
than turning to Africa’s history, he, like Fanon, makes a similar appeal to the 
psychological condition that colonization produces in the colonized individual.270 Unlike 
Fanon, however, Glissant believes that this dislocated and decentralized consciousness 
should be creatively appropriated in a way that both calls into question the European 
notion of individual agency and opens up new discursive possibilities. According to J. 
Michael Dash, “In the post-colonial Caribbean situation, the artist, intellectual, leader 
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1989), xi.  
112 
attempts to give definition to an existential void to impose a total, transcendental 
meaning on the surrounding flux.” 271 This “existential void,” Glissant argues, is a 
function of the fact that those brought to the Antilles in chains were, in the most literal 
sense, robbed of a history and origin that might have enabled this unified notion of a 
self. Furthermore, Glissant suggests that the rigid concept of a self-contained individual 
emerged in Europe as a means of justifying the idea of private property.272 An idea 
antithetical to what it meant to be enslaved, it is no wonder, he suggests, that the psyche 
of the French Caribbean had become so disoriented.  
In Caribbean Discourse, Glissant explains that while the Haitian Revolution 
engendered a sense of solidarity among the colonized in the Antilles, the events that 
followed in the nineteenth century shattered this sense of unity. When the struggle 
ended, Haiti was isolated from the world and Martinique and Guadeloupe where sucked 
back into the structures of French colonialism. With the law of departmentalization in 
1948, he says, “The French Caribbean people [were] thus encouraged to deny 
themselves as a collectivity in order to achieve an illusory individual equality. 
Assimilation made balkanization complete.”273  
   Yet, according to Glissant, the tendency among black intellectuals to impose 
order on this flux suggests that those who have sought to overcome this problem have 
done so by looking outside their own communities.274 Glissant draws on Toussaint 
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274 Ibid, xvii. 
113 
L’Ouverture in his play, Monsieur Toussaint, to illustrate this, by providing an account 
of how L’Ouverture’s fascination with France and his unwillingness to turn towards his 
own community ultimately led to his demise.275 In light of this, Glissant argues that 
rather than trying to suppress the cacophonous identity of the French Antilles, it is 
necessary to uphold it. He calls for a study of the drama of creolization,” or the discourse 
of marginalized communities in their obscure and impossible engagement with the “ideal 
of transparent universality, imposed by the West, with secretive multiple manifestations 
of Diversity.”276 His aim, he explains, is to pull together all levels of experience so as to 
expose the scattered reality of creolization and the fact that what is most definitive of 
these communities is the impulse to find their footing in a reality that continually slips 
away.277  
Given this, he argues that the people of the Caribbean are most at home in this 
obscurity, and through it he believes that liberation is possible. That is, he says, “We 
need those stubborn shadows where repetition leads to perpetual concealment, which is 
our form of resistance.”278 The tension that Price-Mars identifies through his history of 
the Haitian Revolution is thus invoked by Glissant. Neither African nor European, those 
in the Caribbean are displaced. He explains that the process of assimilation that goes 
hand-in-hand with the colonial order ensures an unstable relation with one’s own reality 
for those in the French Antilles. The French Caribbean individual’s alienation arises 
from the impossible choice between being French and being African. For this reason, 
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Glissant argues, he can only subvert this alienation by recognizing himself within the 
absurdity of this tension. Upon doing this, Glissant says, “[the French Caribbean 
individual] can conceive that synthesis is not a process of bastardization as he used to be 
told, but a productive activity through which each element is enriched. He has become 
Caribbean.”279 
With this, Glissant calls for a poetics of the Antilles oriented by the idea of 
movement and excess. He argues that while European poetics is focused on the 
unsayable, this poetics, in being delivered from within the unreasoned ambiguity of 
Creole identity, can say everything. Moreover, he argues that because Caribbean 
consciousness is always tormented by contradictory possibilities, its poetics must be 
oriented by relation rather than rejection. He says:  
Caribbeanness, an intellectual dream, lived at the same time in an unconscious 
way by our peoples, tears us free from the intolerable alternative of the need for 
nationalism and introduces us to the cross-cultural process that modifies but does 
not undermine the latter. What is the Caribbean in fact? A multiple series of 
relationships. We all feel it, we express it in all kinds of hidden or twisted ways, 
or we fiercely deny it. But we sense that this sea exists within us.280 
This notion of a poetics of movement and relation gives rise to the image of the carnival. 
Glissant uses this image to describe being Caribbean as a kind of creative excess, and in 
so doing, suggests that the poetics of the Antilles is not a void, but rather a permanent 
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revolution. Therefore, through the poetics of movement and relation, Glissant provides 
one way out of the dilemma that is created by the specter of exclusion.   
CONCLUSION 
Taken together with Price-Mars and Glissant, it becomes apparent that Arendt’s 
conception of citizenship is too narrow to distinguish sufficiently between political 
inclusion and the violence of assimilation. Moreover, in taking her point of departure 
from the French Revolution alone, she is unable to see that it is constitutive of modern 
political life that becoming enfranchised is accompanied by this violence. By contrast, 
Price-Mars and Glissant, in turning to the Haitian Revolution, are able to not only 
illustrate the significance of the event itself, but also the way in which the problems it 
poses remain present for those who were once cast out. As such they can provide a way 
of reinventing Arendt’s conception of citizenship such that better addresses what it 
means to become enfranchised.  
As I have suggested, the Haitian Revolution cannot not be thought apart from the 
birth of modern politics and must therefore be brought within the fold of the west’s 
historical memory. However, in attempting to appropriate this event in such a way that it 
opens up questions regarding twentieth century political theory, it is also necessary to 
preserve the silent presence of the enslaved masses who brought about this revolution. 
While the Haitian Revolution is emblematic of what the French ideals were meant to do, 
there nevertheless remains an untranslatable aspect of it, a limit that is both exposed in 
the event itself and relevant for rethinking what it means for those who were once 
excluded to take up the task of politics.  
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